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A. Introduction and summary 
 
Sell-side financial analysts working for large brokerage houses, investment banks or 
independent research firms play a fundamental role in nowadays financial markets. In 
essence, their job is to collect, aggregate and process information on listed companies in 
order to prepare comprehensive reports on these companies. These analyst reports usually 
contain a set of quantitative and qualitative information, including a recommendation on 
whether to buy, hold or sell a particular stock, a forecast of the respective company’s 
earnings as well as an estimate of what the reasonable stock price, or target price, for a given 
forecast horizon is. There is ample evidence that market participants act upon sell-side 
research and analysts’ advice. In fact, it is mostly institutional investors, such as investment 
trusts, financial services companies or larger corporations that buy sell-side analyst research 
and use it for their decision making processes on capital markets. Sell-side analysts therefore 
can have a material influence on the asset allocation within an economy, thereby also 
affecting general welfare. 
This role of financial analysts raises a variety of important questions. For instance, is 
analyst research really reliable and worth trading on? Do analysts state matter-of-fact 
opinions and estimates based on a neutral assessment of facts? If an analyst works for a 
brokerage house or investment bank that has business relationships with the company 
subject to a report, how does she deal with potential conflicts of interest and how does that 
affect the quality of her research output? Do such conflicts of interest affect the way 
investors make use of analyst reports? 
The first paper of this thesis contributes to answering some of these questions. Using 
a unique dataset of conflicts of interest reported by a large investment bank, we examine the 
relationship between conflicts of interests and sell-side analysts’ behavior in setting target 
prices and stock recommendations. We demonstrate that the aggregate number of 
simultaneous business ties with a subject company is positively associated with optimism in 
target prices and recommendations. Furthermore, the results provide some indication that 
stocks for which conflicts of interests exist earn lower risk-adjusted returns than 
unconflicted stocks. However, we find no evidence that investors discount the value of sell-
side analysts’ research with respect to the prevailing level of conflicts. 
Another interesting question is to what extent the informativeness of analyst research 
depends on external factors such as the quality of the general information environment of a 
company. We argue that the information environment determines the reliability of corporate 
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information and, ultimately, analyst research. Although it is mutually accepted that analyst 
research can have investment value to the customer, it is not clear ex ante whether it is 
particularly valuable from an investor’s point of view when the information environment is 
rather good or bad. On the one hand, one could argue that in a good information 
environment analyst research is based on high-quality input so that the resulting reports 
contain high-quality recommendations and forecasts as well. In such a situation, investors 
would face only limited risk in relying on analyst research. On the other hand, it could also 
be that financial analysts are particularly valuable when the information environment is bad 
because in such a situation investors might be incapable of obtaining or assessing first-hand 
information themselves and therefore put a lot of trust in the expert opinion of financial 
analysts. 
The information environment of a company arguably depends on a large number of 
factors. Prior research has shown that regulation and governance play a major role in 
determining the reliability of both corporate information and the accuracy of analyst 
research. We point out, however, that despite these striking results the link between the 
regulatory setting and the information value of analyst research from the investors’ point of 
view has not been made. In the second paper, we therefore examine whether the 
informativeness of sell-side analyst reports depends on the strength of the regulatory 
environment of a country and the regulatory background of the institutional investors of a 
company. Our analyses are based on more than 600,000 analyst reports from 2005 through 
2010 from eight leading capital markets (the U.S., the EU5, Switzerland and Japan). Based on 
both measures that we use to proxy for the informativeness of analyst research (i.e., short-
term market reaction and forecast errors with respect to corporate earnings and target 
prices), our results show that the information value of research increases as the level of 
investor protection increases. This finding is robust to different specifications of investor 
protection. We further demonstrate that analyst forecasts are more (less) valuable when the 
majority of institutional investors are from strong (weak) investor protection countries. 
Lastly, we highlight that most academic research on the behavior and importance of 
sell-side analysts has been conducted based on data from fairly stable market environments. 
However, a similar line of argumentation as outlined for the regulation impact above can 
also be applied to the economic cycle. In volatile times the information environment of 
capital markets in general and individual stocks in particular is arguably worse than in 
stable times. Yet it is not easy to predict whether the information value of analyst research is 
higher during financial crises than in non-crisis times or vice versa because analysts 
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themselves and, consequently, the quality of the output they produce, are subject to 
changing information environments. The third paper of this thesis provides empirical 
evidence in this respect. In particular, we explore how the 2008 financial crisis impacted sell-
side analysts’ research as well as the market reactions to the publication of such research. 
Based on over 350,000 analyst reports from 2005 to 2010, we find that during the crisis 
analysts only disproportionately adapted their expectations, relative to the stock market 
development. Overall, they maintained a positive view towards corporate performance and 
stock returns. Consequently, analysts’ accuracy with respect to target prices and earnings 
forecasts significantly deteriorated during the sub-period October 2007 to March 2009, 
leaving their research output (ex-post) less reliable to investors. Strikingly though, investors’ 
responses to target price and earnings forecast revisions were significantly stronger and 
more persistent during than outside the crisis. We conclude that investors relied most on 
analysts when they should have done so least.  
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E-mails: Daniel.Arand@wirtschaft.uni-giessen.de; Alexander.Kerl@wirtschaft.uni-giessen.de
Abstract
Using a unique dataset of conflicts of interest reported by a large investment bank,
we examine the relationship between conflicts of interests and sell-side analysts’
behaviour in setting target prices and stock recommendations. We demonstrate
that the aggregate number of simultaneous business ties with a subject company
is positively associated with optimism in target prices and recommendations.
Furthermore, the results provide some indication that stocks for which conflicts of
interests exist earn lower risk-adjusted returns than unconflicted stocks. However,
we find no evidence that investors discount the value of sell-side analysts’ research
with respect to the prevailing level of conflicts.
Keywords: target prices, stock recommendations, conflicts of interest, bias,
regulation
JEL Classification: G14, G15
1. Introduction
This paper investigates the association between analysts’ target prices, stock recommen-
dations and the level of conflicts of interests that analysts face. If analysts issue biased
research in the presence of business or personal ties with the subject company, then any
failure on the investors’ side to correctly quantify and adjust for this bias will negatively
impact their buying and selling decisions. To shed light on this important question,
we examine the relationship of conflicts of interest that exist between a leading global
investment bank and its covered companies and the optimism of that bank’s analysts when
issuing target prices or stock recommendations. We further analyse whether a potential
optimism in analysts’ target prices and stock recommendations is warranted and how
market participants’ reactions to such analyst output depend upon conflicts of interest.
We thank an anonymous referee for valuable comments and suggestions. Furthermore, we
thank Andreas Walter, Hannes Wagner and seminar participants at the 2011 Conference
of the German Finance Association (DGF), the Annual Congress 2011 of the Verein fu¨r
Socialpolitik, the IFABS 2011 Conference in Rome, and the 2012 Campus for Finance
Research Conference, for helpful comments. Correspondence: Alexander G. Kerl.
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This paper adds to the existing research in two ways. First, in contrast to prior
contributions, our study measures the severity of conflicts of interests using first-hand
information on the business ties that truly and simultaneously exist between the issuer
of the report and the covered company. In 2002/2003, the SEC approved NASD Rule
2711 (‘Communication to the Public’), as well as amendments to NASD Rule 2711
and NYSE Rule 472 (‘Research Analysts and Research Reports’) that define concretely
and in detail what specific types of conflicts investment banks are required to disclose.
As there is no database that provides such information on a large scale, we hand-
collect data from analysts’ reports of one large global investment bank that ranks among
the top 10 in terms of global investment-banking revenue and was part of the Global
Research Settlement in 2003.1 Second, we extend prior research (e.g., Kadan et al.,
2009; Ljungqvist et al., 2007) by focusing not only on the relationship between conflicts
of interests and the optimism of stock recommendations but by additionally analysing
the association between such conflicts of interest and the optimism in analysts’ target
prices. As various published studies have concluded that target prices contain higher
information value than recommendations and earnings forecasts (e.g., Asquith et al.,
2005), the question arises of whether target prices are also tainted when analysts face
such conflicts of interests.
In a first set of analyses, we analyse if optimism in analysts’ target prices and stock
recommendations is associated with the prevailing level of conflicts of interest. We
begin from a bank-specific perspective, considering the cross-section of the target prices
and stock recommendations set by our reference bank on a stand-alone basis. We model
conflicts of interest in two different ways. First, we assess how the intensity of conflicts of
interest, measured as the sum of the simultaneous business ties or personal links between
our reference bank and individual target companies, is related to analysts’ optimism with
respect to these two summary measures. Second, we provide insights on the association
between different types of conflicts of interest and the level of analysts’ target prices
and stock recommendations. We subsequently introduce a relative view and repeat our
analyses to explain the distance of individual target prices and stock recommendations
from the prevailing consensus.
Our results show that a larger number of different conflicts of interest is related
to significantly more optimistic target prices, as measured by both the implied return
forecast that results from a comparison of the target price with the concurrent stock price,
as well as the stock recommendation. With respect to target prices, analysts’ implied
return forecasts are approximately two percentage points higher for every unit increase in
the number of conflicts. Given the fact that the simultaneous occurrence of three or even
more different types of conflicts is a common phenomenon in our sample, we consider
the magnitude of this effect to be economically material.2 Interestingly, the specific type
of the prevalent conflicts of interests is of only minor importance in most of our models.
Hence, the number of different conflicts is a better proxy for analyst affiliation than the
1 It is not our intention to draw individualised conclusions from the behaviour of the analysts
affiliated with a particular investment bank, nor do we intend to be judgmental of a specific
financial intermediary, regardless of the results obtained herein. Instead, we use data from
only one specific investment bank for feasibility reasons because no common database is
available. We therefore refrain from disclosing the name or any other identifying information
regarding our focus bank.
2 Our results are robust to an alternative specification where we model the intensity of
conflicts of interests taking the natural logarithm of the sum of simultaneous business ties.
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explicit types of existing conflicts. Our results hold when controlling for company and
stock characteristics, including size, growth, momentum and volatility. These results are
also robust to considering the excess implied return or stock recommendation measured
net of the concurrent consensus on a particular stock rather than the stand-alone implied
return or stock recommendation from our focus bank.
Given these results, the question arises of whether such differences in analyst optimism
are warranted. For instance, target prices and recommendations on stocks for which
conflicts of interest exist could be more optimistic simply because these firms actually
possess better growth prospects going forward. In this case, analysts from a conflicted
broker may have an information advantage over analysts from an independent research
provider that allows the former set of analysts to better assess the future development of
those companies. To shed light on this issue, we sort stocks of similar forecasts (in terms
of implied return and recommendation level) into different portfolios, depending on the
level of prevailing conflicts of interests. For these portfolios, we compute daily risk-
adjusted abnormal returns based on a Fama-French three-factor model. Our results show
that the portfolios of affiliated stocks do not outperform the portfolios of unaffiliated
stocks. Indeed, there is some weak evidence that daily abnormal returns are negatively
associated with conflict intensity. Based on these results, we conclude that the positive
association between conflicts of interest and analysts’ optimism regarding target prices
and stock recommendations does not stem from fundamental differences between firms
or proprietary information possessed by affiliated analysts.
Finally, we perform a third set of analyses to evaluate howmarket reactions to analysts’
target prices and stock recommendations change with respect to conflicts of interest.
Our results reveal no evidence for any association between the extent to which market
participants respond to stock recommendation or target price revisions contained in
analyst reports and the number of conflicts of interest. Hence, although analysts are
forced to publish the individual conflicts of interests (following NASD Rule 2711 and
NYSE Rule 472) to which they are subject when issuing their reports, investors appear
to be either unaware of these conflicts or reluctant to question the information value of
research issued by affiliated analysts. In any case, as a consequence, they fail to factor
in conflicts of interest.
Although our results are generally consistent and robust, we are aware of several
limitations that suggest directions for future research to confirm and further elaborate
upon our initial findings. First, our analyses are based on a static one-period model,
which raises the question of whether our findings hold when a longer time period is
considered. In particular, comparisons of pre- and post-regulation data would facilitate
the drawing of more precise inferences regarding the effectiveness and shortcomings
of recent regulatory changes. Second, our sample of conflicts of interest is from only
one investment bank. It would be interesting to analyse whether these results hold for a
broader sample containing numerous market players once such data are readily available
through standard databases.However, our results in Section 4.4 already support the notion
that our focus bank behaves consistently with its peers in terms of its recommendations
and target price forecasts issued for a variety of different types of stocks.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 summarises prior
research with respect to analysts’ forecasts in the light of conflicts of interests. Section 3
describes our dataset. Our major empirical results with respect to the association between
target prices, stock recommendations and conflicts of interest are described and discussed
in Section 4. Section 5 investigates the performance of investment portfolios constructed
based on analysts’ recommendations and target prices in the light of such conflicts.
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Section 6 then addresses the association between conflicts of interests and market
reactions to analyst reports. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. Prior Research
Conflicts of interest have received increasing attention from academic researchers and
regulators in recent years, and prior research has shown that such conflicts indeed
are associated with overly optimistic stock recommendations or earnings forecasts by
analysts. This observation applies to a variety of business ties between the issuing bank
and the subject company, such as an underwriting relationship in an IPO or SEO setting
(e.g., Lin and McNichols, 1998; Dechow et al., 2000; O’Brien et al., 2005; Barber et al.,
2007; McKnight et al., 2010) or the bank’s involvement in M&A transactions (e.g.,
Kolasinski and Kothari, 2008). Additional insights are presented by Malmendier and
Shanthikumar (2009) who show that affiliated analysts behave strategically in issuing
overly optimistic recommendations whereas their earnings forecasts tend to be more
negative. Unaffiliated analysts, in contrast, do not show such strategic behaviour. With
respect to market making as a potential form of conflict, related research has revealed
a positive association with analyst following (Chung and Cho, 2005). Madureira and
Underwood (2008) show that sharing information between the research and the market
making arm of investment banks positively impacts liquidity and price discovery
on secondary markets. Several other contributions take an investors’ perspective,
analysing the post-recommendation performance of conflicted vs. unconflicted analysts’
research (e.g., Lin and McNichols, 1998; Michaely and Womack, 1999; Barber et al.,
2007; Bessler and Stanzel, 2009) or assessing the value of correcting for analysts’
over-optimism in stock recommendations (Balboa et al., 2009). These studies focus
exclusively on stock recommendations and typically report an underperformance of
buy recommendations issued by conflicted analysts. Finally, there is mixed evidence
regarding how investors react to conflicted analyst research (e.g., Michaely andWomack,
1999; Agrawal and Chen, 2008). For instance, Bradley et al. (2008) suggest that
market participants do not adequately discount underwriter stock recommendations,
whereas Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007) find that large traders – contrary to
small investors – adjust their trading behaviour with respect to underwriting affiliation.
The evidence of optimism in analyst research in the light of conflicts of interest
has led to a series of major regulatory initiatives, especially in the USA (see NASD
Rule 2711 and NYSE Rule 472). However, several recent contributions suggest that,
despite the partial success of such regulatory efforts, too optimistic analyst opinions
remain an issue of concern. The NASD and NYSE (2005) conclude from various press
articles (e.g., Gasparino, 2004; Smith, 2005) that regulatory reforms have mitigated,
but not eliminated, the relevance of conflicts of interest. Recent empirical research
supports this assertion. For instance, Kadan et al. (2009) report that, even after the
passage of NASD Rule 2711, NYSE Rule 472, and the Global Settlement, analysts
affiliated with an underwriter in a recent equity offering of a company remained reluctant
to issue pessimistic recommendations for that subject company. For the European
market, Dubois et al. (2011) find that following the passage of the Market Abuse
Directive (MAD), recommendations remain positively affected by conflicts that are
older than 12 months and thus not subject to MAD disclosure requirements and that the
effectiveness of such EU-wide regulatory actions is a function of local enforcement
practices. Furthermore, the authors find no evidence that US regulations, such as
C© 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
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NASD Rule 2711 and NYSE Rule 472, mitigate analysts’ over-optimism when
conducting research on European companies.
Whereas prior research has largely focused on the relevance of conflicts of interest
for stock recommendations and earnings forecasts, the association between conflicts of
interests and target price forecasts remains poorly investigated and has only recently
received some academic attention. Lyssimachou et al. (2009) provide initial evidence
on the importance of conflicts of interest for analysts’ target price setting. They show
that, compared with unaffiliated analysts, affiliated analysts provide more optimistic
target prices and are more (less) likely to issue a positive (negative) target price when the
consensus target price relative to the concurrent stock price is negative (positive). Yet,
in contrast to our study, in which we consider a whole set of different types of potential
conflicts of interests, Lyssimachou et al. (2009) only focus on potential conflicts arising
from the fact that an analyst works for the official corporate broker of a company.
3. Data Sample and Summary Statistics
3.1 Data sources
Using analyst report data from FactSet Research Systems Inc., we compile a list of
companies analysed by the research department of one of the world’s leading investment
banks as of August 2010. Our focus bank ranks among the top 10 in terms of global
investment banking revenue and was part of the Global Analyst Research Settlement in
2003. We include all stocks for which FactSet reports an outstanding target price from
this bank, along with the corresponding target price date and the contemporaneous stock
price. For each of these stocks, if available, we further obtain stock recommendations
and the corresponding stock recommendation date from the same database. To be able
to benchmark our focus bank’s target prices and stock recommendations against the
general market consensus, we require at least two research entities other than our focus
broker to have contributed a target price or stock recommendation, respectively, on the
same subject company in the 100 days prior to the date our focus bank’s research report
is issued. Through this procedure, we identify 2,047 individual stocks with complete
target price information, of which 1,851 have contemporaneous stock recommendations
outstanding. The majority of this sample of 2,047 stocks are from the USA, Japan, Hong
Kong and the UK.3
We then make use of the fact that NYSE Rule 472(k)(1) and NASD Rule 2711(h)
require research analysts to disclose the types of conflicts of interest that exist between
their employer and every single company on which they conduct research. For each
company in our list, we read the published disclosure section as per the corresponding
report date to identify detailed information regarding the bank’s conflicts of interest.
We perform this time-consuming task manually to identify, on a company-by-company
basis, whether and which conflicts exist between the bank and a specific company. This
detailed approach goes far beyond the procedures employed in the majority of studies
on this topic, which either use proxy measures for the level of conflicts of interest
or specifically focus only on selected types of conflicts. To analyse the relationship of
conflicts of interests and the level of optimism analysts convey through their target prices
3 Overall, our sample includes stocks from 47 different countries. Among theses, stocks from
the USA represent the largest group (24.9% of the total sample).
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and stock recommendations, wemerge our hand-compiled conflict database with the cor-
responding analyst report information. Additional company-specific information used
as control variables in our regressions is obtained from FactSet Research Systems Inc.
For our analyses of portfolio performance and short-term market reactions, we further
obtain daily stock return data and MSCI global benchmark portfolio returns from
Datastream. We use the MSCI World and country specific indices as market proxies
and daily returns of a 1-month US T-bill as the risk-free rate of return.
3.2 Description of conflicts of interest and other core variables
Because the conflicts of interest listed under NYSE Rule 472(k)(1) and NASD Rule
2711(h) are not mutually exclusive, we aggregate them as follows. If the focus bank
(i) managed or co-managed a public offering of securities for the subject company in
the past twelve months; (ii) received compensation for investment banking services
from the subject company in the past twelve months; (iii) expects to receive or intends
to seek compensation for investment banking services from the subject company in
the next three months; or (iv) currently has or had during the past twelve months an
investment banking services client relationship with the subject company, we record an
investment-banking-related conflict, labelled IB_Client.
If, instead, the bank (i) received compensation for non-investment banking services
from the subject company in the past twelve months; (ii) currently has or had during
the past twelve months a non-investment banking securities-related services client
relationship with the subject company; or (iii) currently has or had during the past
twelve months a non-securities services client relationship with the subject company, we
record a non-investment banking-related conflict, labelled non_IB_Client.
If the issuing bank has direct stock holdings of 1%ormore of common equity securities
of the subject company or if it serves as the market maker for that company’s securities,
we record these conflicts as separate categories, just as they appear in the disclosures
under the rules mentioned above. We label these conflicts Ownership andMktMaker,
respectively.
The remaining types of conflicts that must be explicitly disclosed under NYSE Rule
472(k)(1) or NASD Rule 2711(h), such as whether the analyst or one of her household
members serves as an officer, director or board member of the subject company, are
aggregated in the category Other due to their limited individual relevance in terms
of the number of occurrences in our sample. The described procedure produces five
different categories of conflicts of interest.4
We further define the variable Conflict_score as the aggregate number of conflict
categories that simultaneously apply to a company and calculate it for every observation
(=firm) in our sample. As an alternative, we also compute the natural logarithm
of Conflict_score. Whereas the original variable Conflict_score assumes that each
additional conflict contributes an equal amount to the overall measure (linear model),
its logarithm acknowledges a decreasing marginal effect of each additional conflict.
The described methodology yields a total of 3,631 individual conflicts of interest
for the 2,047 companies for which full target price information is available and 3,323
individual conflicts of interest for the subset of companies with contemporaneous stock
4 An overview of the disclosure requirements in their original wording, including the
respective categorisation, can be found in the Appendix.
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recommendations. These company-conflict-target-price combinations and company-
conflict-stock-recommendation combinations are summarised in Table 1.
To ensure comparability across firms, target prices are considered relative to
the previous day’s stock price. Therefore, we henceforth speak of ‘implied return’
(Implied_return). With respect to stock recommendations, we define the variable
Rec_level, coded equal to 1 if the recommendation is ‘sell’, 2 if it is ‘hold’ and 3
if it is ‘buy’, so that a higher number implies a more optimistic recommendation level.
Panel A of Table 1 gives an overview of the distribution of Conflict_score, Im-
plied_return and Rec_level across our sample. As columns (1) through (7) show, of
the 2,047 companies with full target price information, 325 (15.9%) do not feature
any differentiating conflicts of interest with the focus investment bank. The maximum
number of different conflicts of interest is five, although four is the last category with
a reasonably large number of observations (136 firms, corresponding to 6.6% of the
total). The mean implied returns range from 14.5% for companies associated with no
conflicts of interest to 23.8% if the number of conflicts is four or above.
Columns (8) through (12) present very comparable insights for the subsample of
1,851 firms with valid stock recommendations. We point out that the distribution of
stock recommendations becomes more optimistic as Conflict_score increases. More
precisely, the percentage of sell recommendations decreases from 14.1% for companies
associated with zero conflicts of interest to 8.5% if the level of conflicts is four. At
the same time, the proportion of buy recommendations increases from 47.7% for zero
conflicts to 67.8% for four simultaneous conflicts.
We present a formal analysis and interpretation of the figures in the next section,
but it can be readily observed that both the implied returns and the level of stock
recommendations tend to increase with the number of conflicts of interest.
Panel B of Table 1 describes how the 3,631 individual conflicts for the target price
sample and the 3,323 conflicts for the companieswith concurrent stock recommendations
(indicated in parentheses) break down into the different conflict categories. The most
frequent conflict is IB_Client, which applies to 1,477 (1,357) different firms, whereas
882 (820) observations feature a non_IB_Client conflict. Ownership and MktMaker
are less frequent, with 557 (513) and 422 (413) occurrences, respectively. In contrast
to the breakdown by Conflict_score (Panel A), no obvious pattern concerning the
distribution of implied returns and stock recommendations is observable across the
different types of conflicts of interest, although it should be noted that target prices and
stock recommendations for companies with any type of conflict are consistently more
optimistic than for companies with no conflicts of interest.
3.3 Description of control variables
In themultivariate analyses in Section 4.2 of this paper, and again in Section 6, we include
various control variables. As is common in previous studies, we control for the natural
logarithm ofmarket capitalisation,measured inmillions of Euros (Market_cap)5 and the
company’s price-to-book ratio (Price_Book). Market capitalisation is often considered a
valid proxy for the information environment of a company (e.g., Stickel, 1995), whereas
5 Whereas our regression analyses in Tables 4 through 6 and Table 8 use the logarithm of the
market capitalisation, the descriptive statistics in Table 2 are based on the original values of
market capitalisation (in millions of US dollars).
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the price-to-book ratio is a common indicator for whether a stock is a growth or a value
stock.
Based upon the methodology in Ljungqvist et al. (2007), we further account for the
coverage intensity as the logarithm of the total number of analysts, other than those
from our focus bank, that provide target prices or, analogously, stock recommendations,
for a specific stock within the 100-day window prior to the target price or stock
recommendation date of our focus bank (Coverage_intensity)6.We posit that the number
of analysts covering a stock is a proxy for the attention the stock receives from analysts
and investors.
It is reasonable to assume that the historic performance of a stock can influence
analyst opinions (e.g., Kadan et al., 2009; Dubois et al., 2011). We therefore consider
a stock’s total return realised in the year prior to the date that our focus bank issued
the corresponding target price or stock recommendation (Hist_performance) in our
analyses. In addition, we argue that the volatility of a stock is another driver of analyst
optimism. We therefore include the annualised one-year historic standard deviation of
daily stock returns (Volatility) within all regressions.
Table 2 summarises the control variables for all levels of Conflict_score (Panel A) and
all individual conflicts (Panel B), based on the full sample of companies featuring valid
target price information.7 As shown in Panel A, company size and coverage intensity
rise with an increase in Conflict_score. In contrast, the price-to-book ratio, momentum
and volatility display a decreasing trend as Conflict_score increases. These observations
indicate that conflicts of our focus bank are more frequent with larger companies, value
stocks and firms that attract analysts’ attention.
4. Conflicts of Interest and Analyst Optimism
4.1 Univariate analyses
For a first impression of the relationship between conflicts of interest and analysts’ target
price setting and stock recommendation behaviour, we compare the mean and median
values of implied returns and recommendation levels across different levels of conflicts
of interests. Whereas Panel A of Table 3 focuses on implied returns, the results with
respect to recommendation levels can be found within Panel B.
In Panel A of Table 3, column (5) illustrates the difference between the average
implied return for Conflict_score levels one through five and the corresponding mean
for the group of companies with no conflicts (Conflict_score = 0), which serves as
our reference group, featuring a mean (median) implied return of 14.5% (13.3%). For
Conflict_score = 2, the mean (median) implied return is 18.9% (16.8%), which is
6 Table 2 displays descriptive statistics based upon the original values. With respect to the
multivariate regression analyses, we proceed as follows to account for the fact that the number
of analysts following a specific company and that company’s size are interrelated: We first
regress the natural logarithm of the number of target price or recommendation inputs on
the natural logarithm of the US dollar market capitalisation. For our estimations in Table 4
through 6 and Table 8, we then use the residuals as a proxy for analyst attention that is not
explained by firm size.
7 The summary statistics remain virtually unchanged if displayed for the sub-sample of stocks
for which both target price and recommendation are available.
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Table 3
Univariate analyses of differences in implied returns and stock recommendations (stand-alone)
This table presents stand-alone mean and median values of Implied_return (Panel A) and Rec_level
(Panel B) for different levels of Conflict_score, as well as univariate tests of differences between
these values across the different levels of Conflict_score. In Panel A, Implied_return is the ratio
of a stock’s target price, scaled by the concurrent stock price. In Panel B, Rec_level is the stock
recommendation level coded equal to 1 if the recommendation is ‘sell’, 2 if it is ‘hold’ and 3 if it
is ‘buy’, respectively. Conflict_score is the number of simultaneous conflicts of interest. Column (5)
shows differences between the respective group mean for each Conflict_score > 0 (column (3)) and
the mean of the reference group with Conflict_score = 0. The corresponding significance levels and
t-statistics (column (6)) are based on a two-sided t-test. Column (7) shows differences between the
respective group median for Conflict_score > 0 (column (4)) and the median of the reference group
with Conflict_score = 0. The corresponding significance levels and z-statistics (column (8)) are based
on a Wilcoxon-signed-rank test on equality of distributions. Differences are in percentage points (pp).
∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level (two-tailed), respectively.
Panel A: Implied returns by number of different conflicts of interest
Implied_return Group difference vs. Conflict_score=0 (in pp)
Conflict_ Total comp.
score # N Mean Median Diff. Mean t-value Diff. Median z-value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0 325 14.5% 13.3% n/a n/a n/a n/a
1 552 16.6% 13.7% 2.1 1.2 0.5 0.7
2 591 18.9% 16.8% 4.5∗∗∗ 2.7 3.5∗∗∗ 3.2
3 431 20.6% 17.6% 6.1∗∗∗ 3.8 4.3∗∗∗ 4.3
4 136 23.8% 20.0% 9.4∗∗∗ 3.8 6.8∗∗∗ 4.3
5 12 24.3% 22.7% 9.8 1.4 9.4 1.6
Total 2,047 18.3% 15.8%
Panel B: Stock recommendations by number of different conflicts of interest
Rec_level Group difference vs. Conflict_score=0 (in pp)
Conflict_ Total comp.
score # N Mean Median Diff. Mean t-value Diff. Median z-value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0 277 2.3 2 n/a n/a n/a n/a
1 493 2.3 2 −0.1 −1.2 0 −1.2
2 557 2.4 2 0.0 0.3 0 0.3
3 397 2.4 3 0.1 1.5 1 1.4
4 118 2.6 3 0.3∗∗∗ 3.4 1∗∗∗ 3.6
5 9 2.7 3 0.3 1.4 1 1.5
Total 1,851 2.4 2
approximately 4.5 (3.5) percentage points (pp) larger than the average of the reference
group. The mean difference further increases to 6.1 pp or 9.4 pp for companies that
have three or four different types of conflicts with our focus bank, respectively.8 All
8 We ignore a Conflict_score level of five in our discussions due to the limited number of
observations.
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three differences are significantly different from 0 at the 1% level. We consider the
magnitude of the spread up to 9.4 pp economically material, given that more than 28%
of the companies in our sample possess three or more conflicts of interest with the bank
under consideration.
Panel B of Table 3 confirms these results with respect to the level of stock
recommendations. In particular, Wilcoxon signed-rank tests demonstrate that stock
recommendations are significantly more optimistic when Conflict_score is equal to
four, compared with the no-conflicts reference group.
4.2 Multivariate analyses
We now apply multivariate regression techniques to further assess the relationship
between conflicts of interests and sell-side analysts’ target prices and stock recommen-
dations. To facilitate the interpretation of the results, we run different regressions with
a stepwise inclusion of our set of control variables. Columns (1) through (3) of Table 4
contain regression estimates from an ordinary least-squares model, with Implied_return
as the dependent variable. In columns (4) through (6), the dependent variable isRec_level,
and we use ordered probit regressions to account for the ordinal scale of Rec_level.
Using ordered probit allows us to consider all three different recommendation levels
that our database contains. This acknowledges the fact that analysts started issuing more
hold and sell recommendations following recent regulatory reforms, such as NASD
Rule 2711 (see, e.g., Barber et al., 2006). Historically, they only reluctantly issued sell
recommendations and their overall share war almost negligible.9
In the base models (columns (1) and (4)), we regress Implied_return and Rec_level
on Conflict_score as the only independent variable. Based on this generic model,
we then include a set of company-specific controls, namely, Market_cap, Price_Book
Coverage_intensity, Hist_performance and Volatility in the regressions in columns (2)
and (5).10
Finally, we complete our models by considering the relationship of Market_cap,
Price_Book and analysts’ behaviour in the presence of conflicts of interest. It is rea-
sonable to assume that larger companies or companies with higher growth expectations
have a higher need for brokerage and investment banking services. Therefore, they might
be subject to higher levels of conflicts of interests. Consequently, it could be that the
strength of the association between an analyst’s optimism and the number of conflicts
of interest relates to the subject company’s size and growth prospects.11 In columns (3)
and (6) of Table 4, we consequently include the interaction terms of Conflict_score with
9 As a robustness check, we follow the methodology of Barber et al. (2006) and use a probit
model that compares buy recommendations with all other recommendations (both hold and
sell recommendations). The results remain qualitatively unchanged.
10 The values for Coverage_intensity used in the regressions are the estimation residuals ob-
tained from regressing Coverage_intensity onMarket_cap (see the discussion in Section 3.3).
11 In this section, we do not posit that optimism is a consequence of conflicts of interest. We
only argue that if analyst optimism is unwarranted and a sign of conflict-induced bias, then
the extent to which this is the case is likely to vary with the size and growth prospects of the
subject company.
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Table 4
Regression of stand-alone implied return (OLS) and recommendation level (ordered probit)
on conflict intensity
This table presents regression results of Implied_return and Rec_level on Conflict_score and various
control variables. Implied_return is the ratio of a stock’s target price, scaled by the concurrent stock
price. Rec_level is the stock recommendation level coded equal to 1 if the recommendation is ‘sell’,
2 if it is ‘hold’ and 3 if it is ‘buy’, respectively. Conflict_score is the number of simultaneous conflicts
of interest. Market_Cap is the natural logarithm of the company’s market capitalisation in millions of
US dollars. Price_Book is the price-to-book ratio as per the last fiscal year end. Coverage_intensity
is estimated as the residual from a regression of the natural logarithm of the number of analysts
other than the one from the focus bank with an outstanding target price on the same company on
the natural logarithm of the company’s market capitalisation in millions of US dollars. Volatility is
the annualised standard deviation of daily stock returns of the company. Hist_performance is the
cumulative historic one-year stock return. Models (1) through (3) are estimated using ordinary least
squares, while models (4) through (6) are estimated using ordered probit regression. All regression
models use Huber/White robust standard errors; corresponding t-values (z-values) are in parentheses.
∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level (two-tailed), respectively.
Implied_return Rec_level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Conflict_score 2.168∗∗∗ 2.323∗∗∗ 2.173∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗
(4.968) (4.327) (4.002) (4.177) (2.859) (2.685)
Market_cap −0.019 −0.037 0.100∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗
(−0.031) (−0.059) (3.887) (3.970)
Price_Book −0.116∗∗ −0.124∗ 0.005 0.008
(−2.223) (−1.882) (1.284) (1.177)
Conflict_score x 1.001∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗
Market_cap (2.803) (2.141)
Conflict_score x 0.067 0.013∗
Price_Book (1.069) (1.689)
Coverage_intensity −3.291∗∗∗ −3.148∗∗∗ −0.121∗∗ −0.116∗∗
(−2.828) (−2.715) (−2.051) (−1.966)
Volatility 0.534∗∗∗ 0.536∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗
(7.590) (7.639) (3.438) (3.541)
Hist_performance −0.110∗∗∗ −0.110∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(−7.331) (−7.390) (2.750) (2.834)
Constant 18.305∗∗∗ 3.982∗ 3.264
(35.060) (1.915) (1.572)
N 2,047 1,939 1,939 1,851 1,752 1,752
Adj. R2/Pseudo R2 1.1% 9.5% 9.9% 0.5% 1.5% 1.8%
F/Chi2 24.68 19.06 16.81 17.44 52.54 56.87
Market_cap and Price_Book.12 A positive coefficient of either interaction term would
indicate an even stronger association between the Conflict_score and implied return, or
12 Market_cap and Price_Book are centered around their respective means. Based on
this procedure, the base coefficients displayed reflect the effect of Conflict_score on
Implied_return and Rec_level, conditional on Market_cap and Price_Book taking their
respective average values.
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stock recommendation, in case of high market capitalisation or price-to-book ratio of
the company in question, and vice versa.
We calculate Huber-White robust standard errors (Huber, 1967; White, 1980)
throughout our multivariate analyses.
The results in Table 4 have several interesting implications. First, the results
consistently show that analysts’ implied returns and stock recommendations increase
in the number of simultaneous conflicts of interest, all significant at the 1% level. For
example, the 2.17 from model (3) indicates that, for a company that is ‘average’ with
respect to Market_cap and Price_Book, every unit increase in the number of conflicts of
interest is associated with an average increase in implied return forecast of approximately
2.17 pp. Given that Conflict_score ranges from zero to four in our sample and that 28%
of the companies in our sample are associated with a Conflict_score of three or higher,
these results are not only statistically significant but also economically material.13
Second, the coefficient on the interaction term of Conflict_score with Market_cap
is positive and significant at the 1% (5%) level with respect to the implied return
(column (3)) and recommendation level (column (6)). The result suggests that the positive
association between the optimism in analysts’ target prices and stock recommendations
and conflict intensity is more pronounced for larger companies. With respect to the
price-to-book ratio, the coefficient of the interaction term is also positive across both
model specifications, although only significant at the 10% level for the recommendation
level model (column (6)).
Turning towards the set of control variables, Market_cap is significant and positively
associated with the stock recommendation level whereas Price_Book, on the contrary, is
negatively associated with an analyst’s implied return. Concerning Coverage_intensity
(Volatility), Table 4 reveals a significant negative (positive) association with analysts’
optimism overall. Finally, the coefficient on Hist_performance shows a negative
(positive) association with the implied return (recommendation level). The latter result is
in line with previous studies (see, e.g., Jegadeesh and Kim, 2006) which report a higher
past performance for stock recommendation upgrades than for downgrades, suggesting
that analysts tend to follow a momentum logic.
For robustness reasons, we perform two sets of additional analyses within unre-
ported regressions. First, we use the natural logarithm of Conflict_score instead of
Conflict_score itself in order to capture a potentially decreasing marginal effect of an
additional conflict. The results for this alternative specification are qualitatively identical
to those presented within Table 4. Hence, our overall results do not seem to depend on
how conflict intensity is actually measured. In the remainder of the text, we will use the
linear form of Conflict_score.
Second, we perform all regressions based on the sub-sample of US companies of our
data (24.9% of the total sample). Although this reduces the number of observations
that are used within the regression considerably, the main result of the coefficient of
Conflict_score being significantly positively associated with Impl_ret and Rec_level
still holds across all different model specifications.
13 The major results in Table 4 remain qualitatively unchanged when we deploy individual
types of conflicts of interest, as they are disclosed under NYSE Rule 472(k)(1) and NASD
Rule 2711(h), instead of the aggregate categories IB_Client and non_IB_Client. In that case,
Conflict_score ranges from zero to nine.
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4.3 Individual conflicts of interest
In the previous section, we accounted for the relevance of conflicts of interests via a
proxy that evaluates the severity of such conflicts by measuring the number of different
conflicts that coexist, irrespective of their nature (Conflict_score).We now run additional
regressions of Implied_return and Rec_level on dummy variables indicating the presence
of each individual type of conflict. The results are displayed in Table 5.
With respect to the regressions of Implied_return on each single type of conflict
in columns (1) through (4), all conflict-specific coefficients are positive, with absolute
values ranging from 1.43 for Ownership to 4.80 for MktMaker. Statistical significance is
most pronounced for IB_Client andMktMaker (p-value< 0.01), whereas the coefficient
of non_IB_Client is significant at the 5% level. This pattern directionally persists when
all types of conflicts are considered simultaneously, although IB_Client and MktMaker
remain the only single conflicts that are significantly associated with implied return
forecasts at the 10% and 1% level, respectively (column (5)). The coefficient estimates
concerning all other variables that we control for are in line with our prior results
from Table 4. One potential explanation for the high significance of MktMaker could
be that this conflict frequently occurs jointly with one of the other types of conflict.
This would lead to a misspecification of the model as we would be incorporating two
different variables that measured the same effect. However, this is not actually a major
issue, as MktMaker has only moderate correlations of 0.16 with IB_Client and 0.17
with non_IB_Client, respectively, whereas the correlation with Ownership is even lower.
Nevertheless, we run additional regressions for Table 4 where we exclude MktMaker, or
any other individual type of conflict, from the calculation of Conflict_score to control
for a potentially dominating effect of one single type of conflict. Untabulated results
show that our key findings, including a highly significant Conflict_score coefficient,
remain qualitatively unchanged.
The right part of Table 5 (columns (6) through (10)) suggests that non_IB_Client is
the only individual conflict positively associated with analysts’ research output when
considering stock recommendations. In contrast to the results regarding implied returns,
IB_Client and MktMaker are statistically insignificant. Thus, these findings support our
argumentation that no single type of conflict plays a dominating role in our sample.
Overall, we conclude from the results in Tables 4 and 5 that although each
individual type of conflict is positively associated with analysts’ target prices and stock
recommendations, considering just one conflict explicitly often captures only a part of
this effect. The aggregate number of different conflicts that coexist between a stock
researcher and the subject companies appears to be a better proxy for the extent to which
an analyst is conflicted than whether specific types of conflicts exist individually. We
conjecture that a higher number of simultaneous conflicts could imply that not just one
but different departments of the issuing bank or brokerage house are affiliated with the
subject company.
4.4 Target prices and recommendation levels vs. consensus
Thus far, we have limited our analyses to the implied return forecasts and stock
recommendations issued by our focus bank on a stand-alone basis. We now extend
our analyses by replacing the stand-alone measures with their respective differences
from the prevailing consensus. The consensus target price is measured as the arithmetic
mean of all outstanding target prices issued by stock researchers other than our focus
C© 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
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broker in the 100-day window preceding the date when the stand-alone target price was
issued. We consider all consensus inputs as valid and up-to-date target prices of the
respective issuers per the date on which our focus bank disseminated its estimate. This
assumption allows us to calculate the consensus implied return by simply dividing the
consensus target price by the stock price on the estimate day of the focus bank’s target
price. The difference between the stand-alone and consensus implied returns is shown in
percentage points. We call this alternative dependent variable Excess_implied_return.
The consensus recommendation is measured as the median recommendation level of
all outstanding stock recommendations issued by institutions other than our focus broker
in the 100-day window preceding the date when the stand-alone recommendation was
issued. Consequently, the difference is simply the difference between the stand-alone
recommendation and the consensus, ranges from −2 to +2 and is scaled ordinally. We
call this variable Rec_Diff.
Because individual business ties, as published by our focus broker, exist between the
bank and the corresponding company but not necessarily between other banks and that
company, Conflict_score is the only variable that potentially differentiates our focus
bank from its peers. With regard to all other variables of the model (such as company
size, historic performance or volatility), our focus bank and all other banks will base
their research on exactly the same set of information and firm characteristics. Departing
from the model specifications in Table 4, it is therefore reasonable to expect that the
number of conflicts is the only relevant factor in explaining Excess_implied_return and
Rec_Diff. Nonetheless, it is unclear to what extent this is the case because a higher
Conflict_score for a company in our sample might accompany a higher likelihood of the
consensus being subject to conflicts of interest with the same company as well because,
for instance, the respective company is simply larger.14
Table 6 displays the results from regression models analogous to those in Table 4.
The main results for Excess_implied_return (columns (1) through (3)) resemble those
for the stand-alone models, for which Implied_return served as the dependent variable.
As expected, Conflict_score is the only variable that is significantly associated with
analysts’ relative target price optimism when implied returns are considered net of
consensus because it is the only variable that measurably differentiates our focus bank
from its peers.15
Similar evidence with respect to Conflict_score can be observed in models (4)
through (6), for which Rec_Diff serves as the dependent variable. Compared with the
stand-alone recommendation level, most control variables become insignificant, which
is in accordance with our prediction. We interpret these observations as an indication
that Conflict_score is, in fact, unique to our focus bank.
14 In fact, larger companies establish investment banking relations with a number of different
investment banks. For example, an IPO is likely to be managed by a lead underwriter and
several co-underwriters. Hence, for companies that feature a high level of conflicts of interest
with our focus bank, one can reasonably assume that a number of other banks are also subject
to conflicts of interestswith that firm. Thiswould lower the influence ofConflict_scorewithin
the model that considers the target price setting and stock recommendation behaviour of our
focus bank versus the consensus from the market as a whole.
15 Again, the results hold when we do not aggregate conflicts of interest into the main
categories IB_Client and non_IB_Client so that Conflict_score ranges from zero to nine.
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Table 6
Regression of implied return (OLS) and recommendation level (ordered probit) difference vs.
consensus on conflict intensity
This table presents regression results of Excess_implied_return and Rec_Diff on Conflict_score and
various control variables. Excess_implied_return is the percentage point difference between the focus
bank’s implied return for a stock and the mean consensus implied return for the same company,
where the implied return is the ratio of a stock’s target price, scaled by the concurrent stock price.
Rec_Diff is the difference between the focus bank’s stock recommendation level and the median
consensus stock recommendation level, each coded equal to 1 if the recommendation is ‘sell’, 2 if it
is ‘hold’ and 3 if it is ‘buy’, respectively. Conflict_score is the number of simultaneous conflicts of
interest. Market_Cap is the natural logarithm of the company’s market capitalisation in millions of
US dollars. Price_Book is the price-to-book ratio as per the last fiscal year end. Coverage_intensity
is estimated as the residual from a regression of the natural logarithm of the number of analysts
other than the one from the focus bank with an outstanding target price on the same company on
the natural logarithm of the company’s market capitalisation in millions of US dollars. Volatility
is the annualised standard deviation of daily stock returns of the company. Hist_performance is
the cumulative historic one-year stock return. Models (1) through (3) are estimated using ordinary
least squares, while models (4) through (6) are estimated using ordered probit regression. All
regression models use Huber/White robust standard errors; corresponding t-values (z-values) are in
parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level (two-tailed),
respectively.
Excess_implied_return Rec_Diff
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Conflict_score 1.385∗∗∗ 1.224∗∗∗ 1.242∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗ 0.045∗ 0.043∗
(2.982) (2.951) (2.881) (2.312) (1.930) (1.843)
Market_cap 0.108 0.116 0.018 0.019
(0.204) (0.216) (0.838) (0.865)
Price_Book −0.046 −0.048 0.008∗∗ 0.007∗
(−1.277) (−1.103) (2.520) (1.831)
Conflict_score x −0.144 0.005
Market_cap (−0.266) (0.341)
Conflict_score x 0.001 0.002
Price_Book (0.018) (0.573)
Coverage_intensity −0.179 −0.201 −0.113∗∗ −0.112∗∗
(−0.135) (−0.156) (−2.101) (−2.084)
Volatility −0.030 −0.030 0.004 0.004
(−0.506) (−0.507) (1.585) (1.602)
Hist_performance 0.006 0.007 −0.001 −0.001
(0.328) (0.340) (−1.011) (−0.983)
Constant −0.637 0.156 0.256
(−1.320) (0.079) (0.118)
N 2,047 1,939 1,939 1,851 1,752 1,752
Adj. R2/Pseudo R2 0.5% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.2%
F/Chi2 8.89 2.71 2.08 5.35 16.43 23.50
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5. Conflicts of Interest and Portfolio Performance
The results presented thus far raise the question of whether the positive association
between the number of simultaneous conflicts of interest and analysts’ expectations con-
cerning firm performance, as expressed via implied returns or stock recommendations,
is warranted. In fact, there are alternative possible explanations for the results presented
in Section 4. On the one hand, it is conceivable that the companies with which the broker
or analyst issuing the research report is affiliated through conflicts of interest merit more
optimistic recommendations and target price forecasts because they are fundamentally
better or relatively more undervalued than other companies. One could also imagine
that analysts are more optimistic with respect to specific companies that they cover
because they have access to private information as part of performing tasks such as IPOs
or other investment banking services. Analyst research reports that are optimistic due
to preferential access to novel information would thus be justified in these cases, and
investors could profit from following the advice from analysts with such access.
On the other hand, analysts are often suspected of being subject to misaligned
incentives. If, for example, an analyst holds an equity stake in the subject company,
she will profit from issuing favourable research leading to stock price increases.
Alternatively, if the brokerage house or investment bank for which an analyst works
has a business relationship with the subject company, the departments involved in this
relationship could exert pressure on the analyst to publish favourable research, e.g., in
order to curry management favour and tighten the client relationship (see, e.g., Ertimur
et al., 2007).
If such circumstances relate strongly to analysts’ optimism, research from an affiliated
analyst should not be any more valuable from an investor’s perspective than research
from an unaffiliated analyst, and following an affiliated analyst’s advice could even be
detrimental to the investor’s wealth.
To address this issue, we analyse whether risk-adjusted returns differ between stocks
featuring conflicts of interests and those that are free from any conflict. In the case of
Implied_return, we partition our sample into terciles of high, medium, or low implied
return forecast. Within each of these terciles, we then split our sample according to
the level of Conflict_score (zero to five), yielding 18 different portfolios in total.
Analogously, if we base the portfolio selection on Rec_level, we first classify the
sample into buy, hold and sell recommendations and then, within each category,
differentiate between the different levels of Conflict_score. Again, this results in
18 different portfolios.
All portfolios are formed as of August 2010, which represents the date as of which
the list of companies that are covered by our focus bank was compiled (see Section 3.1).
For our analysis, we assume a holding period of 12 months and equal weights of the
stocks constituting each portfolio. During the holding period, wemeasure daily abnormal
performance of each portfolio based on a risk-adjusted three-factor model as suggested
by Fama and French (1993). As we have companies from different countries in our
sample, we obtain themarket returns aswell as the returns to the Fama-French benchmark
portfolios based on the MSCI World index from Datastream. We use the daily yield of a
one-month US Treasury bill as the risk-free rate of return.16
16 MSCI index data have been used by various authors to implement factor-model analysis
on an international scale (see, e.g., Lundgren and Olsson, 2010). Datastream offers return
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Panel A of Table 7 shows the (12 months holding period) intercept estimates from
regressing daily portfolio returns in excess of the risk-free rate on the market premium
and the two Fama-French factors (i.e., SMB and HML) for each of the 18 portfolios
based on Implied_return (the left part of the table) and on Rec_level (the right part of the
table). In each cell, the first figure is the coefficient estimate (i.e., daily abnormal return),
the figure below is the corresponding t-value, and the third figure is the number of stocks
allocated to the portfolio. Panel B displays the difference between each portfolio’s return
and the return of the unconflicted portfolio (Conflict_score = 0).
Focusing on Panel A first we observe that portfolios with stocks accounting for two
or three conflicts of interests earn significantly negative abnormal returns, whereas
for portfolios of stocks with zero and one conflict of interest daily abnormal returns
are not significantly different from zero. With respect to portfolio results of positive
forecasts (buy recommendations and high implied returns), we interpret the results
as weak evidence that conflicts of interest relate negatively to the investment value
of analyst research, with portfolio returns lower than that what one would expect
after controlling for the three Fama-French factors. Abnormal returns of portfolios
of stocks that are subject to four conflicts of interests are also negative, although
not statistically significant. One reason for this could be the much lower number of
observations as compared to all portfolios based on fewer numbers of conflicts of interests
(zero to three). Nevertheless, although the evidence for a significant underperformance
across all portfolios is somewhat limited, we can at least conclude that (for positive
recommendations) affiliated analysts do not seem to base their recommendations on
private information that leads to a consistent outperformance. Consistent with the
results in Panel A, Panel B directionally suggests that conflicted stocks underperform
unconflicted stocks to some extent. However, the statistical significances are admittedly
weak.
With respect to the least optimistic forecasts, in particular those with a sell recommen-
dation, the significantly negative intercept estimates of a portfolio of stocks subject to a
higher number of conflicts of interests (Conflict_score= 2 andConflict_score= 3) imply
that the analyst’s opinion is indeed valuable to investors (see Panel A).17 In particular,
if the analyst’s outlook is pessimistic, there is some evidence that stocks featuring
conflicts of interest earn significant abnormal returns on average. Again, the results
are in line with Panel B. If even an affiliated analyst cannot avoid issuing pessimistic
research, however, problems at the respective company are obvious and serious, leading
to poor stock performance. From an investment perspective, such (negative) information
is particularly reliable.18
data on small growth stocks, small value stocks, large growth stocks and large value stocks
within theMSCIWorld index, fromwhich we calculate the Fama-French factors SMB (return
difference of small minus big companies) and HML (return difference of high minus low
book-to-market companies).
17 For four simultaneous conflicts the intercept estimates are also negative, though statistically
insignificant, which we attribute to the small number of observations of only 10.
18 As a robustness check, we alternatively assume a holding period of just 3 months and
perform the identical analyses. The results remain directionally identical compared to the
12 months holding period.
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Table 7
Fama-French daily abnormal returns to portfolios based on implied return and
recommendation level (12 months holding period)
This table presents daily abnormal return estimates from Fama-French three-factor models for different
portfolios, based on (i) analyst optimism with respect to Implied_return or Rec_level and (ii)
Conflict_score. In the case of Implied_return, stocks are clustered into terciles; in the case of Rec_level,
stocks are clustered according the stock recommendation level (sell, hold or buy). Conflict_score is
the number of simultaneous conflicts of interest. Fama-French estimations make use of the MSCI
World index as market proxy, as well as benchmark portfolios based on the MSCI World index. The
daily return of a 1-month US Treasury bill is the risk-free rate of return. Portfolios are constructed as
per August 2010 and held over a period of 12 months. Panel A shows the abnormal returns for each
individual portfolio. In each cell, the first figure is the coefficient estimate. The second figure is the
corresponding t-value from the regression. The third figure is the number of stocks allocated to the
respective portfolio. Panel B displays the difference between the coefficient estimate for a portfolio
of 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 conflicts of interest and the coefficient estimate for a portfolio with no conflicts of
interest but in the same implied return or stock recommendation cluster. In each cell, the first figure
is the abnormal return difference. The second figure is the F-statistic from a Wald test of equality
of coefficients. All regression models use Huber/White robust standard errors. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level (two-tailed), based on a standard t-test (Panel A)
or a Wald test (Panel B), respectively.
Panel A: Abnormal returns by Conflict score
Portfolio formation criterion
Implied_return Rec_level
Conflict_
score # Low Medium High Sell Hold Buy
0 −0.013 −0.013 −0.039 −0.004 −0.030 −0.005
(−0.465) (−0.456) (−1.170) (−0.128) (−1.083) (−0.165)
136 100 89 39 106 132
1 −0.029 −0.016 −0.056∗ −0.025 −0.020 −0.033
(−1.129) (−0.628) (−1.794) (−1.103) (−0.614) (−1.167)
223 171 158 86 189 218
2 −0.032 −0.041∗∗ −0.037∗ −0.036∗∗ −0.035 −0.038∗∗
(−1.574) (−2.287) (−1.939) (−1.976) (−1.566) (−2.152)
177 209 205 75 211 271
3 −0.018 −0.037∗∗ −0.048∗∗∗ −0.041∗∗ −0.025 −0.039∗∗∗
(−1.257) (−2.357) (−2.605) (−2.089) (−1.495) (−2.610)
115 150 166 41 149 207
4 −0.025 −0.004 −0.024 −0.002 −0.016 −0.016
(−1.451) (−0.242) (−1.085) (−0.054) (−0.933) (−0.838)
30 47 59 10 28 80
5 −0.023 −0.023 −0.053 −0.068 −0.158 −0.025
(−0.442) (−0.584) (−0.994) (−0.717) (−1.368) (−0.548)
2 5 5 1 1 7
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Table 7
Continued.
Panel B: Abnormal return differences by Conflict score (benchmark: Conflict_score = 0)
Portfolio formation criterion
Implied_return Rec_level
Conflict_
score # Low Medium High Sell Hold Buy
1–0 −0.016 −0.003 −0.017 −0.021 0.010 −0.028
(0.410) (0.020) (0.290) (0.850) (0.100) (0.980)
2–0 −0.019 −0.028 0.002 −0.032∗ −0.005 −0.033∗
(0.900) (2.430) (0.010) (3.080) (0.050) (3.510)
3–0 −0.005 −0.024 −0.009 −0.037∗ 0.005 −0.034∗∗
(0.140) (2.330) (0.230) (3.550) (0.110) (5.190)
4–0 −0.012 0.009 0.015 0.002 0.014 −0.011
(0.510) (0.220) (0.470) (0.000) (0.670) (0.340)
5–0 −0.010 −0.010 −0.014 −0.064 −0.128 −0.020
(0.040) (0.060) (0.070) (0.460) (1.230) (0.200)
These results are consistent with the majority of earlier contributions, including Lin
and McNichols (1998), who find no long-term return advantage of recommendations
issued by analysts affiliated with a lead underwriter compared with those from unaffili-
ated analysts. Michaely and Womack (1999) and Bessler and Stanzel (2009) even find
that underwriter buy recommendations earn significantly lower long-run returns than
unaffiliated buys. Similarly, Barber et al. (2007) report a significant underperformance
of investment banks’ buy recommendations, along with an outperformance of their sell
recommendations, compared with recommendations issued by independent research
firms.
6. Market Reactions to Analyst Reports in the Light of Conflicts of Interest
Finally, we address the question of whether market participants appropriately account
for the level of conflicts of interests that each analyst is subject to. The relevance of the
finding that conflicts of interests and optimism in both target prices and recommendations
are positively associated depends upon how investors react to conflicted vs. unconflicted
research. If investors adequately discount analysts’ opinions in the presence of conflicts
of interest, overly optimistic recommendations and target price forecasts would not
represent a problem for capital markets.
To analyse investor reactions to analyst reports, we calculate daily abnormal returns,
based on a market model and standard event-study methodology, within the three-day
[−1;+1] and five-day [−2;+2] windows around the publication date of each analyst
report in our sample.19 With respect to target price revisions, we follow Asquith et al.
(2005) and others and define a variableTP_Rev, which is equal to the percentage change
between the previous and current target prices issued by our focus investment bank for
19 We estimate OLS parameters in the estimation period [−250] through [−11] and use
country-specific MSCI market returns from Datastream for each stock.
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each covered company. With respect to stock recommendations, we define two dummy
variables, labeled Rec_Up and Rec_Down, which are equal to one if the current stock
rating is above or below the previous level, respectively, and zero otherwise.
In addition to the requirement that we have information on both target price revision
as well as recommendation changes, we discard the extreme top and bottom 1% of
cumulative abnormal returns as well as target price revisions to mitigate the potentially
distorting effect of outliers or data errors in the sample.
Table 8 is set up as follows. In columns (1) to (4) we use the three-day abnormal returns
from day [−1] to [+1], relative to the analyst report date, as the dependent variable. In
columns (5) to (8), we instead use abnormal returns from day [−2] to [+2]. Within the
first model of each event-window (columns (1) and (5)), we regress abnormal returns on
recommendation upgrades (Rec_Up), downgrades (Rec_Down), target price revisions
(TP_Rev). At the same time, we include Conflict_score, as well as its interactions with
Rec_up, Rec_Down and TP_Rev, as additional regressors inmodels (1) and (5) to control
for a potential adjustment of market reactions with respect to conflicts of interest.
Additionally, we include the full set of control variables as well as country dummies
to control for country-specific effects on market reactions. Concerning stock recom-
mendation revisions, the results show that analyst reports trigger significant abnormal
stock returns. Similarly, there is a strong average market reaction to changes in an
analyst’s target price. We note that these results are consistent with those reported in the
prior literature, suggesting that target price changes provide information in addition to
that conveyed through stock recommendations (e.g., Brav and Lehavy, 2003; Asquith
et al., 2005). Concerning Conflict_score and its interactions with Rec_up, Rec_Down
and TP_Rev, we find no evidence that investors consider conflicts of interest when
trading on stock recommendations or target prices as all corresponding coefficients are
statistically insignificant.
Within further sets of analyses (columns (2) to (4) for the three-day event-window
and columns (6) to (8) for the five-day event-window) we follow Barber et al. (2006)
and additionally report regressions for the sub-samples focusing only on upgrades,
reiterations and downgrades. This acknowledges the fact that control variables might
behave differently with respect to each type of recommendation.20 Again, based on the
results of these sub-samples, we find no evidence that investors discount the value of sell-
side analysts’ research with respect to the prevailing level of conflicts when following
analysts’ target price and recommendation revisions. Hence, it seems as if investors
are either unaware of these conflicts or reluctant to question the information value of
research issued by affiliated analysts.
The prior literature reports mixed results regarding this aspect. Bradley et al. (2008),
for example, conclude that investors are unable to discount affiliated analysts’ stock
recommendations. In contrast to their conclusion, though, Agrawal and Chen (2008)
and Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007) find that the intensity of conflicts of interest
does have a mitigating effect on market reactions to recommendation changes. However,
neither of the references cited in this context control for target price changes which,
among others, Asquith et al. (2005) prove to be even more important to investors than
stock recommendations.
20 One drawback of splitting the sample in this fashion is the reduced number of observations
that fall in the upgrade (55) and downgrade (51) sub-samples.
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7. Conclusion
Based on a novel measure for the severity of conflicts of interest, we analyse the
relationship between prevailing conflicts of interests and sell-side analysts’ behaviour
with respect to target prices and stock recommendations. To address this issue, we make
use of the fact that conflicts of interest must be disclosed under NYSE Rule 472(k)(1)
and NASD Rule 2711(h). Our results show a positive association between the optimism
in analysts’ recommendations and target prices and the prevailing level of personal
or business ties with a subject company. The aggregate number of different conflicts
that simultaneously apply to a subject company better explains this association than do
indicators of individual conflicts. Furthermore, the results also hold when our focus
bank’s target prices and stock recommendations are considered relative to the market
consensus, although statistical significances slightly decline in the latter setting. Overall,
we conclude that the number of different conflicts of interest relates positively to target
prices and stock recommendations. In this context, we confirm prior research (e.g.,
Kadan et al., 2009; Dubois et al., 2011) on analyst stock recommendations.
Based on these results, we further analysewhether this association between conflicts of
interest and analyst optimism is warranted or not. Risk-adjusted daily abnormal returns
from Fama-French portfolio analysis suggest that affiliated analysts are not better stock
forecasters than unaffiliated analysts. Indeed, our results even show some (limited)
evidence for an underperformance of stocks that receive favourable research from an
analyst who is subject to conflicts of interest. Again, our findings are in line with earlier
contributions (e.g., Lin and McNichols, 1998; Barber et al., 2007) that focus on stock
recommendations.
Finally, we do not find any evidence that investors take conflicts of interests into
account when trading on stock recommendations and target prices. Hence, investors
appear to be either unaware of these conflicts or reluctant to question the information
value of research issued by affiliated analysts.
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Abstract 
We examine whether the informativeness of sell-side analyst reports depends on the 
strength of the regulatory environment of a country and the regulatory background of the 
institutional investors of a company. Our analyses are based on more than 600,000 analyst 
reports from 2005 through 2010 from eight leading capital markets (the U.S., the EU5, 
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Based on both measures that we use to proxy for the informativeness of analyst 
research (i.e., short-term market reaction and forecast errors with respect to corporate 
earnings and target prices), our results show that the information value of research increases 
as the level of investor protection increases. This finding is robust to different specifications 
of investor protection. We further demonstrate that analyst forecasts are more (less) valuable 
when the majority of institutional investors are from strong (weak) investor protection 
countries.  
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1. Introduction 
This paper addresses the question to what extent the informativeness of sell-side 
analyst research depends on the prevailing regulatory environment. On the one hand, the 
previous literature considers the information environment, such as the regulatory and 
institutional background of a company, and the informativeness of analyst research as 
substitutes (see, e.g., Subramanyam, 1996). That is, analysts are more relevant to the stock 
market when other sources of information are scant. Loh and Stulz (2011), for example, find 
that analysts’ recommendations are more likely to be influential on stock prices in the case of 
small companies with only low analyst following. Similarly, Lang et al. (2004) report a 
positive valuation effect of analyst coverage in the case of poor internal and weak country 
level external governance. 
On the other hand, other studies suggest that the general information environment of 
a company and the informativeness of analyst research are complements. Francis et al. 
(2002), for example, find a positive relation between abnormal returns and the information 
contained in both earnings information and analyst reports. The authors do not find that the 
informativeness of earnings announcements is reduced by the simultaneous publication of 
analyst reports. In line with this result, Frankel et al. (2006) explicitly state that the 
information value of analyst research and financial statements are complements and that 
analyst report informativeness increases with institutional ownership. 
Within this paper, we follow the latter view and argue that better shareholder 
protection leads to a higher quality of financial reporting and corporate disclosure that 
ultimately translates into better inputs for analyst research and, hence, more valuable 
forecasts. We thus add to the literature that has primarily used the legal environment and 
ownership structure of a company to explain analysts’ incentives to produce analyst 
research and to cover certain stocks.1 The previous research has found plenty of evidence in 
regard to the regulatory and institutional environment’s positive influence on the quality of 
financial reporting (see, e.g., La Porta et al., 2000; Ball et al., 2000). Leuz et al. (2003) reveal 
that earnings management decreases in investor protection. DeFond et al. (2007) further 
show that annual earnings announcements are more informative in countries in which 
insider trading laws are better enforced. Similarly, Haw et al. (2012) find that in countries 
with strong investor protection, greater financial disclosure and higher-quality earnings are 
                                                     
1 Bushman et al. (2005), for example, find that the strength of the legal environment is positively associated with 
the number of analysts issuing research on a company. Similarly, Bhushan (1989) argues that analyst following 
increases in institutional ownership. This finding could be related to the fact that institutional investors are the 
main consumers of analyst research. 
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associated with more informative stock prices about future earnings. With respect to the 
shareholder structure of a company, Yeo et al. (2002) and Velury and Jenkins (2006) 
demonstrate that the quality of reported earnings increases with institutional ownership. 
This finding is consistent with large external stockholders assuming a monitoring role in 
corporations (see, e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Chen et al., 2007). 
Following this evidence, our study contributes to the existing literature by analyzing 
whether the regulatory environment influences the informativeness of analyst research 
because analysts directly depend on the quality of information available to them as inputs. 
Based on the assumption that the quality of financial reporting and the information value of 
analysts’ forecasts are complements, we analyze whether the informativeness of analysts’ 
research is affected by (i) the overall level of investor protection within a country and (ii) the 
regulatory background of the institutional investors of a company. To measure the 
informativeness of forecasts, we use two different approaches. First, we follow Frankel et al. 
(2006) by focusing on the short-term market reaction in response to the publication of an 
analyst report. Under the assumption of efficient capital markets in which any new 
information instantaneously influences stock prices, the market reactions following the 
revision of analysts’ forecasts serve as a valid proxy for the information value that market 
participants attribute to new information. Second, we also compute report-specific target 
price and earnings forecast errors. By comparing, for example, the actual reported earnings 
with the previously issued earnings forecast, it is possible to identify which forecasts were 
more accurate and therefore contained more information value. 
Before describing our results, we would like to comment on the measures that we 
use to identify the level of investor protection. Because different shareholder protection and 
regulatory enforcement measures have been suggested within the previous literature (e.g., 
La Porta et al., 1998; Djankov et al., 2008; Jackson and Roe, 2009), we deploy a set of 
conceptually different approaches in this context. These measures cover formal indicators of 
the strength of the applicable shareholder rights law as well as enforcement proxies that 
estimate the degree to which individuals and institutions can rely on norms and regulations 
being put into effect and the intensity with which wrongdoing is being prosecuted. 
With respect to the first measure of forecast informativeness, namely, the short-term 
market reaction, our results reveal that the value of analyst reports depends significantly on 
the country-specific level of investor protection. For analysts’ target price and earnings 
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forecast revisions2, we find a material increase in information value as the level of investor 
protection increases. However, our results also show that recommendation upgrades are not 
considered valuable within strong investor protection countries, whereas this is the case in 
weak investor protection environments. One possible explanation for this finding is that 
strong investor protection markets such as the U.S. are characterized by more sophisticated 
market participants who properly discount the value of potentially biased recommendations. 
All our results are robust to the different specifications of investor protection that we apply. 
We further refine our analyses and find that the information value of analysts’ 
forecasts also depends on the investor-specific regulatory background. In particular, our 
results suggest that the informativeness of analysts’ forecasts increases (decreases) in line 
with the percentage of institutional investors from strong (weak) investor protection 
countries. For example, in the subset of companies located in strong investor protection 
environments such as the U.S., those companies with a high percentage of foreign 
institutional ownership (and, hence, an increased likelihood of institutional shareholders 
being located in less regulated countries) presumably are characterized by worse 
governance and a lower quality of financial reporting. This scenario consequently leads to 
analyst forecasts that are of reduced information value. Analogously, we find that 
companies located in weak investor protection environments benefit from a high percentage 
of foreign institutional ownership (and, hence, an increased likelihood of institutional 
shareholders being located in more regulated countries). This result could be attributed to 
better governance, which positively affects a company’s information environment and 
ultimately results in analyst research of higher information value. Our results therefore 
support the previous findings of Aggarwal et al. (2011) who have shown that in weak 
shareholder protection countries improvements in governance are predominantly initiated 
by foreign institutions from high regulation countries. 
With respect to the second measure of forecast informativeness, namely, the report-
specific earnings and target price forecast error, our results are directly in line with our 
previous findings. We show that earnings and target price errors are significantly lower in 
strong investor protection environments. This finding supports previous studies revealing 
that the accuracy of earnings forecasts is positively related to a company’s information 
environment. For instance, Lang and Lundholm (1996) provide evidence that analysts’ 
earnings forecasts are more accurate when better disclosure policies are in place. In addition, 
                                                     
2 For the purpose of this paper, “revisions” in terms of analysts’ stock recommendations, target prices and 
earnings forecasts include both changes and reiterations of the prior forecast levels.  
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Hope (2003) explicitly shows that strong accounting standard enforcement improves 
analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy. 
Based on the general result that analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy is also positively 
associated with institutional ownership (see Ljungqvist et al., 2007), we again refine our 
analyses to better understand the role that the regulatory background of institutional 
investors of a company plays with regard to analyst forecast accuracy. Our results show that 
forecasts are more (less) accurate when the institutional investors of a company are likely to 
be from strong (weak) investor protection countries. Particularly for high-protection 
countries, we find that earnings and target price forecast errors are significantly lower when 
domestic institutional ownership is high, whereas foreign institutional ownership (likely 
stemming from less regulated backgrounds) is positively associated with forecast errors. 
Overall, with respect to the informativeness of analyst research, our findings are 
robust to both measures for the information value of analysts’ forecasts (namely, the short-
term market reaction and the forecasting error). Hence, we provide evidence that the level of 
the prevailing regulatory environment and the regulatory background of the institutional 
investors are closely related to analysts’ forecast informativeness. Our results might 
therefore help regulators and investors alike assess the impact of regulation, both directly 
and indirectly (via the ownership structure of a company), on the information value of 
financial research. It could be advisable for regulators to establish and guard strong investor 
protection environments because these environments not only translate into a higher quality 
of financial disclosures but also into more valuable information published by sell-side 
analysts.  
The paper continues as follows. Section 2 describes our data and research design. 
Section 3 focuses on the impact of the regulatory environment on market reactions to the 
dissemination of analyst research. Section 4 elaborates on the influence of the regulatory 
environment on forecast accuracy. Finally, Section 5 provides concluding remarks. 
 
2. Data sample 
2.1. Analyst report and stock information 
Our dataset is based on a panel of analyst reports from eight major stock markets for 
the period 2005 through 2010. The countries included are the U.S., the EU5 (i.e., France, 
Germany, Italy, Spain and the U.K.), Switzerland and Japan. These markets account for 
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approximately 56% of the world’s total market capitalization3 and represent the majority of 
financial and economic hubs, while at the same time featuring different regulatory 
characteristics and company shareholder structures. 
We obtain analyst report data such as earnings forecasts, target prices and stock 
recommendations from FactSet.4 Along with I/B/E/S, FactSet is one of the leading data 
providers for the financial academic community and practitioners5 and is used by virtually 
all major global investment banks and 95 of the top 100 asset managers (Heston and Sadka, 
2010). A number of recent analyst-related academic studies also rely on FactSet data, 
particularly when stocks from different countries are considered (see, e.g., Balboa et al., 2008, 
2009; Bessler and Stanzel, 2009). 
For a company to be included in our sample, we require a minimum coverage by 
three or more different analysts in at least one calendar year within our sample period. For 
each report, we define dummy variables indicating whether the stock recommendation 
represents an upgrade (ܷܲ), a reiteration (ܴܧܫܶ) or a downgrade (ܦܱܹܰ) compared to the 
same analyst’s previous rating on the same stock, as well as variables measuring the 
percentage change in an individual analyst’s target price (ܶܲ_ܴܧܸ) or earnings forecast 
(ܧܲܵ_ܴܧܸ) on a given stock.6 To avoid a distorting effect of stale information in our sample, 
we only calculate these revisions if the previous stock recommendation, target price or 
earnings forecast was issued within 90 days prior to the current report. For our main 
analyses, we further require that information on all three summary measures, namely stock 
recommendation, target price and earnings forecast, is jointly available in the current and 
preceding report. In addition to recommendations, target prices and earnings forecast 
revisions, our dataset further includes the research date of each report as well as the 
corresponding concurrent stock price in the same currency as the target price and earnings 
forecast reported by the analyst. 
To measure abnormal stock returns around the issuing date of an analyst report, we 
obtain concurring stock return data from Datastream. We calculate abnormal returns from a 
standard market model based on daily returns (see, e.g., Brown and Warner, 1985; 
MacKinlay, 1997) in which the estimation period ranges from day -250 until day -11 relative  
                                                     
3 According to Bloomberg as per June 2010. 
4 FactSet typically receives its analyst report information via data transfer/interfaces. Hence, this information 
does not necessarily represent written reports but should be considered as a data feed to FactSet.  
5 According to Nomura, FactSet offers major company and stock metrics on an even larger number of companies 
than I/B/E/S does (see Fraser-Jenkins et al., 2009). 
6 ܶܲ_ܴܧܸ  is calculated as ሺܶ ௧ܲ െ ܶ ௧ܲିଵሻ ܶ ௧ܲିଵ⁄ , while ܧܲܵ_ܴܧܸ  is calculated as ሺܧܲ ௧ܵ െ ܧܲ ௧ܵିଵሻ |ܧܲ ௧ܵିଵ|⁄ . An 
overview of variable definitions and sources is provided in the Appendix. 
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to the research date of the analyst report. Following Asquith et al. (2005) and other studies, 
we aggregate the daily abnormal returns over the five-day window surrounding the analyst 
reports in our sample (ܥܣܴሺെ2;൅2ሻ).7 In line with previous studies (see, e.g., McKnight and 
Todd, 2006), we drop observations from our sample if the stock price on the research date is 
less than or equal to USD 1.00 to ensure that our results are not influenced by small, illiquid 
stocks or extremely large bid-ask spreads. 
In our market reaction analyses, we further ignore observations that represent the 1% 
and 100% percentiles of target price and earnings forecast revisions, respectively, to 
eliminate potential outliers. This step is taken because extreme revisions are potentially 
linked to coding errors in either current or prior forecasts.8 
The described procedure yields 687,781 analyst reports on 4,789 different companies. 
Table 1 gives an overview of our sample, indicating the number of observations per country 
and year. Approximately 45% of our observations are from countries other than the U.S., 
which is similar to the approximately 42% of firm-year earnings forecasts for non-U.S. 
companies in Barniv et al.’s (2005) study on 33 different countries and to Jegadeesh and 
Kim’s (2006) article in which non-U.S. companies account for nearly 41% of recommendation 
revisions from the G7 countries. The increase in observations between 2005 and 2010 is in  
large part attributable to an increase in the number of brokers submitting report information 
to FactSet and to an increase in the number of reports per broker and year. 
                                                     
7 The five-day window allows for early information leakage and post-announcement drift in abnormal stock 
returns associated with the publication of analyst research. We point out that our findings are robust to using 
alternative event windows. In particular, we perform our analyses using the eleven-day cumulative abnormal 
returns (ܥܣܴሺെ5;൅5ሻ) and the one-day abnormal returns (ܣܴሺ0ሻ) on the analyst report date only.  
8 See, among others, Frankel et al. (2006) and Chan et al. (2007) for a similar approach to control for potential 
outliers. 
Table 1: Number of analyst reports by country and year
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
France 8,407 7,681 6,996 7,462 9,949 19,849 60,344
Germany 4,384 5,239 6,032 6,481 9,757 19,520 51,413
Italy 2,139 1,731 1,862 2,606 3,851 8,919 21,108
Japan 1,244 1,749 3,281 5,776 8,483 17,941 38,474
Spain 2,712 2,118 2,024 2,247 3,625 7,662 20,388
Switzerland 4,234 3,834 3,989 4,809 6,152 9,401 32,419
United Kingdom 8,453 8,972 9,688 10,997 15,236 29,083 82,429
United States 26,313 35,335 40,041 52,068 80,755 146,694 381,206
Total 57,886 66,659 73,913 92,446 137,808 259,069 687,781
This table shows the number of analyst reports with relevant recommendations, target price and earnings forecast revisions by
country and year. The data are based on a panel of analyst reports on companies from the U.S., the EU5, Switzerland and Japan over
the period 2005 through 2010.
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Table 2 provides information on the distribution of stock recommendation revisions 
and summary statistics for target price and earnings forecast revisions. In all countries, 
approximately 90% of the recommendations represent a reiteration of the prior analyst 
opinion. In contrast to previous studies that have shown more frequent recommendation 
changes (see, e.g., Asquith et al., 2005), we attribute our finding to the high and increasing 
number of analyst reports, particularly in recent years (see Table 1). Because 
recommendations are the most visible assessment of a company, analysts who regularly 
cover a stock refrain from changing stock recommendations too frequently. With respect to 
target prices and earnings forecasts, analysts issue updated forecasts on either one of the two 
variables in 91.4% of all reports in our sample. Hence, the majority of reports contain new 
information on these two forecast measures. The average target price revision ranges 
from -0.4% in Japan to 1.0% in the U.K. and Germany. The average earnings forecast revision 
is lowest in Italy at 0.1% and, again, largest in the U.K. and Germany at 1.4%.9  
 
2.2. Measures of investor protection 
Previous academic research has proposed a plethora of different investor protection 
proxies, and there has been extensive controversy and discussion regarding the adequate 
measurement of shareholder rights. We therefore deploy several widely accepted and 
conceptually different investor protection indicators, all measured at the country level and 
taken from the previous literature. We first use a dummy variable (ܥܱܯܯܱܰ) indicating the 
legal origin (common law versus civil law) of a country, building on the notion that common 
law countries have, on average, stronger investor protection rights than civil law ones (La 
Porta et al., 1998). Our next measure is the anti-self dealing index (ܣܵܦܫ) from Djankov et al. 
(2008), which was developed as a more accurate and more theoretically grounded 
alternative to La Porta et al.’s (1998) anti-director rights index of investor protection.10 The 
anti-self dealing index focuses on a country’s regulations that outline the rules of private 
enforcement mechanisms available to minority shareholders, based on a stylized transaction 
that would expropriate investors. In addition to the improved quality of the anti-self dealing 
                                                     
9 In comparison to former studies (see, e.g., Asquith et al., 2005), average earnings and target price revisions 
across all countries appear to be lower on average. However, whereas forecast revisions in Asquith et al. (2005) 
stem from 1997 to 1999 and, hence, a bull market with mainly positive forecast revisions, revisions within our 
study stem from different market phases in the period from 2005 to 2010. Consequently, mean forecast revisions 
that contain both positive and negative revisions are lower on average. 
10 Djankov et al.’s (2008) anti-self dealing index effectively addresses a number of shortcomings of La Porta et 
al.’s (1998) anti-director rights index that have been revealed by the literature. See Djankov et al. (2008) for a 
detailed discussion on the methodology and the advantages of their index. 
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index as compared to the anti-director rights index, the former is based on more recent 
regulation (2003) than its predecessor (approximately 1993).11 
However, Durnev and Kim (2005) and Sun (2009) argue that measures based on 
formal rules and regulations are merely de jure indicators that might not appropriately 
capture the strength of investor protection if law enforcement is ineffective. This notion is 
empirically supported by DeFond and Hung (2004), who report a positive governance 
impact of strong law enforcement institutions, but not of investor protection laws. Therefore, 
we further include two de facto measures of law enforcement. We follow Leuz et al. (2003) 
and include as our third variable a legal enforcement proxy (ܷܲܤܮ_ܧܰܨ), defined as the 
mean of the following three variables also documented in La Porta et al. (1998): the 
efficiency of the judicial system, the rule of law, and the level of corruption.12 The final 
measure that we deploy is the number of the securities regulator’s staff members, divided 
by the country’s population in millions (ܵܶܣܨܨ_ܧܰܨ ). This resource-based indicator of 
public enforcement is taken from Jackson and Roe (2009) and can be considered a proxy for 
a regulator’s power to deter and prosecute wrongdoing in capital markets. Jackson and Roe 
(2009) acknowledge that their resource-based approach is not the panacea to the question of 
how investor protection can be adequately measured. However, they point out some of this 
approach’s advantages over more formal protection clauses: “Regulatory independence and 
high levels of agency authority are of little value to effective enforcement if the agency’s budget is 
minuscule and its staffing thin. And conversely, a not-very-independent regulator with a high budget 
and strong staffing indicates that political and market authorities have given the agency the go-ahead 
to enforce financial rules. Similarly, a well-staffed and well-funded agency can, even if it has only 
limited formal sanctioning authority, make good use of the sanctions that it has.” 
Table 3 provides an overview of the investor protection variables used in this paper. 
For each measure, a higher value indicates a higher level of investor protection based on the 
specific definition. For instance, the number of enforcement staff per 1 million inhabitants 
(ܵܶܣܨܨ_ܧܰܨ) is much higher in the U.S. (23.75) and the U.K. (19.04), compared to the other 
European countries (between 4.43 and 8.50), Switzerland (8.87) and Japan (4.32), which 
suggests comparably strong investor protection in the U.S. and the U.K. according to this 
measure. 
                                                     
11 However, the original anti-director rights index developed by La Porta et al. (1998) is very popular and has 
been used extensively in the related literature (see, e.g., DeFond and Hung, 2004, 2007; Durnev and Kim, 2005). 
We therefore repeat all estimations in this paper that relate to the strength of investor protection with this 
original index. Our major results remain qualitatively unchanged. 
12 Note that the enforcement proxy suggested by Leuz et al. (2003) has also received much attention in the recent 
literature and is the law enforcement measure of choice in numerous studies (see, e.g., DeFond and Hung, 2007; 
Sun, 2009). 
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2.3. Institutional ownership 
Apart from the overall regulatory environment of a country, we additionally aim to 
measure whether the regulatory background of a company’s institutional investors affects 
the informativeness of analysts’ forecasts. To measure institutional holdings for each 
company, we use data from the FactSet/LionShares database.13 For each company included 
in our data, we obtain on a quarterly basis the percentage of domestic institutional 
ownership, i.e., the percentage of holdings attributable to institutions based in the same 
country in which the stock is listed ( ܫܱ_ܦܱܯ ) alongside the percentage of foreign 
institutional ownership (ܫܱ_ܨܱܴ).14 These alternative measures of the ownership structure of 
a company are also used by Aggarwal et al. (2011), among others.15 
 
                                                     
13 See Ferreira and Matos (2008) and Aggarwal et al. (2011) for a thorough explanation of the primary sources 
used by FactSet/LionShares to compile ownership data, as well as several arguments asserting the quality and 
acceptance of this data provider. 
14 Table 3 displays descriptive statistics based upon original values. With respect to multivariate regression 
analyses, we proceed as follows. We first regress institutional ownership on the natural logarithm of the U.S. 
dollar market capitalization (i.e., company size). This pre-estimation is performed for both domestic and foreign 
ownership. For our estimations in Table 5 to Table 9, we use the residuals as a proxy for institutional ownership 
that is not explained by company size. 
15 In some cases, FactSet/LionShares reports institutional ownership of more than 100%. FactSet/LionShares 
names several potential reasons for this occurrence. Such reasons include, for instance, double-counting in 
certain short transactions when both borrower (or buyer) and lender of stocks report the same equity stake, as 
well as double-counting of the same institution’s holdings because of a name change. We treat these observations 
as if institutional ownership data were missing. 
Table 3: Investor protection and institutional ownership by country
Investor protection and enforcement Institutional ownership
Country COMMON ASDI PUBL_ENF STAFF_ENF IO_DOM IO_FOR
France Civil 0.38 8.68 5.91 9.7% 17.9%
Germany Civil 0.28 9.05 4.43 6.3% 23.9%
Italy Civil 0.42 7.07 7.25 1.7% 16.9%
Japan Civil 0.50 9.17 4.32 7.1% 11.9%
Spain Civil 0.37 7.14 8.50 3.0% 13.0%
Switzerland Civil 0.27 10.00 8.87 6.5% 24.1%
United Kingdom Common 0.95 9.22 19.04 42.1% 26.0%
United States Common 0.65 9.54 23.75 69.3% 5.8%
Mean 0.48 8.73 10.26 43.7% 12.7%
Median 0.40 9.11 7.88 49.9% 8.3%
This table shows summary statistics for different investor protection and corporate ownership measures at the country level. The
data are based on a panel of analyst reports on companies from the U.S., the EU5, Switzerland and Japan over the period 2005
through 2010. COMMON indicates whether a country has a common-law legal origin. ASDI is the anti-self dealing index from
Djankov et al. (2008). PUBL_ENF is the legal enforcement index used in Leuz et al. (2003). STAFF_ENF is the resource-based
enforcement measure proposed by Jackson and Roe (2009). For each measure, a higher value indicates a higher level of investor
protection based on the specific definition. With respect to institutional ownership, IO_DOM represents holdings by institutions
from the same country in which the stock is listed. IO_FOR represents holdings by institutions from a different country than the
country in which the stock is listed. All ownership variables are measured as per the end of the calendar quarter prior to the analyst
report date and expressed as a fraction of market capitalization. All figures represent sample averages at the country level.
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We match our analyst report and ownership data using the ownership information 
for the subject company as per the end of the calendar quarter prior to the research date of 
the analyst report. For the indicators of institutional ownership, Table 3 provides average 
values across our analyst report sample by country. Domestic institutional ownership is 
most important in the U.S. and the U.K., with average values of 69.3% and 42.1%, 
respectively. Spain and Italy feature the lowest values, with 3.0% and 1.7%, respectively. 
Whereas foreign institutional ownership is quite low in the U.S. (5.8%), countries such as 
Germany (23.9%), Switzerland (24.1%) and the U.K. (26.0%) feature high foreign ownership. 
The figures displayed in Table 3 are in line with those reported in Aggarwal et al. (2011) and 
Ferreira et al. (2010). 
 
2.4. Control variables 
We include several control variables measured at the company level in our analyses. 
First, we include the natural logarithm of the market capitalization measured in U.S. dollars 
(ܮܱܩ_ܯܭܶܥܣܲ) and the price-to-book ratio (ܲܶܤܸ), both on the research date of the analyst 
report. The source for these variables is Datastream. In rare cases, the price-to-book ratio is 
smaller than or equal to zero; in those cases, we drop these observations from the sample. 
We further include the three-month prior performance (ܴܲܫܱܴ_ܲܧܴܨ) as received from 
Datastream.16 Additionally, we obtain information about concurrent news and events from 
                                                     
16  We alternatively use other specifications of prior performance such as the one-month and six-month 
performance, which do not alter our results. 
Table 4: Average values of control variables by country
MKTCAP PTBV PRIOR_PERF PRIOR_EVENT
France 18,004 2.0 1.9% 27.5%
Germany 16,683 2.2 2.6% 29.7%
Italy 17,347 1.9 -0.2% 30.4%
Japan 11,792 1.7 -1.9% 28.5%
Spain 21,681 2.9 0.8% 20.2%
Switzerland 35,739 3.2 1.3% 21.1%
United Kingdom 25,779 5.3 3.2% 22.1%
United States 14,492 3.7 1.4% 38.5%
Total 17,468 3.4 1.5% 32.9%
This table shows summary statistics for a set of control variables at the company level. The data are based on a panel of analyst
reports on companies from the U.S., the EU5, Switzerland and Japan over the period 2005 through 2010. MKTCAP is the market
capitalization in million U.S. dollars (in our regression analyses, we use logarithmic values). PTBV is the price-to-book ratio.
PRIOR_PERF is the stock-specific cumulative stock return over the three months prior to the abnormal return window.
PRIOR_EVENT represents the fraction of analyst reports preceded by a general meeting, an earnings release call or a
sales/revenue release by the subject company within the five days prior to the publication date of an analyst report.
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FactSet. Namely, we include a dummy variable (ܴܲܫܱܴ_ܧܸܧܰܶ) that equals one if the 
publication of a report from our sample was preceded by a general meeting, an earnings 
release call or a sales/revenue release by the subject company within the five days prior to 
the publication date. 
  
3. Investor protection, institutional ownership and the informativeness of analyst 
reports 
3.1. Specification of regression analyses 
In this section, we analyze the effect of the intensity of investor protection on the 
information value of analyst research. Analogous to Frankel et al. (2006), we consider the 
abnormal market reaction to the dissemination of sell-side analyst research a valid proxy for 
analyst report informativeness. Throughout this section, our dependent variable is the five-
day cumulative abnormal return (ܥܣܴሺെ2;൅2ሻ) around the research date of an analyst 
report. Our independent variables include the dummy variables that capture whether the 
current stock recommendation represents an upgrade (ܷܲ) or a downgrade (ܦܱܹܰ) relative 
to the previous rating as well as the percentage change in target price (ܶܲ_ܴܧܸ ) and 
earnings forecast (ܧܲܵ_ܴܧܸ). Most importantly, we further include in our regression models 
the interactions between these forecast revision variables and our different investor 
protection measures because our main interest is to assess whether and to what extent the 
level of information value of analyst research depends on the regulatory environment. For 
example, we not only include the variable ܶܲ_ܴܧܸ  but additionally include  
ܶܲ_ܴܧܸ ൈ ܥܱܯܯܱܰ to identify whether markets react differently to target price revisions in 
common law countries compared to civil law countries. 
The company level control variables defined in the previous section extend the set of 
regressors. All regressions are estimated using a fixed effects model, in which we allow for 
cross-sectional and time dependence in our data by including analyst-company and year 
dummies in the regression models. Following Petersen (2009), we calculate robust standard 
errors clustered by analyst-company. 
 
3.2. The impact of investor protection on analyst report informativeness 
The first set of regressions aims at disentangling the relationship between investor 
protection and the informativeness of analyst reports. Our results are displayed in Table 5, 
which is set up as follows: models (1) to (3) use ܥܱܯܯܱܰ as an investor protection measure 
and display the regressions including each of the three forecast measures (i.e., 
14 
 
recommendation changes, target price and earnings forecast revisions), along with their 
respective interactions, individually. Model (4) uses all three different forecast measures 
jointly to identify potentially different market reactions to analysts’ forecasts in common 
versus civil law countries. Models (5) to (7) replicate model (4), substituting ܥܱܯܯܱܰ with 
the alternative investor protection measures ܣܵܦܫ, ܷܲܤܮ_ܧܰܨ and ܵܶܣܨܨ_ܧܰܨ.17  
Before looking at the interaction coefficients revealing potential differences in market 
reactions between, for example, common and civil law countries, we point out that the new 
information that is included within the revisions of the three analyst measures contains 
information value for capital markets.18 As the corresponding base coefficients across all 
models suggest, even the stock market in countries with weak investor protection 
significantly reacts to updated information within analyst reports. Whereas the market 
reaction is positively associated with recommendation upgrades as well as target price and 
earnings forecast revisions, it shows a negative association with recommendation 
downgrades. These results are consistent with previous research such as Asquith et al. 
(2005). 
Turning to the interactions between the investor protection indicator (i.e., ܥܱܯܯܱܰ 
in models (1) to (4)) and changes in analysts’ opinions, Table 5 reports several interesting 
results.19 Whereas model (1) does not reveal strong differences between common and civil 
law countries with respect to market reactions to upgrades (or downgrades), models (2) 
and (3) individually suggest that the information value of target price and earnings forecast 
revisions, as measured by the respective stock price reactions, is positively associated with 
investor protection. Hence, target price and earnings forecast revisions are of higher 
information value in common law countries compared to civil law countries. Correlation 
analyses further show that forecast revision measures are only weakly correlated. The 
highest correlation can be found between target price and earnings forecast revisions with 
20%. We therefore pool all forecast measures in one regression, similar to Asquith et al. 
(2005), to examine whether our results still hold when all measures are considered 
simultaneously. The results in model (4) support our previous findings for target price and 
earnings revisions. A comparison of the interaction coefficients with the base coefficients
                                                     
17 Similar to models (1) to (3) that use ܥܱܯܯܱܰ  to measure investor protection, we also run the reduced 
regressions that only focus on one forecast measure within each model for ܣܵܦܫ, ܷܲܤܮ_ܧܰܨ and ܵܶܣܨܨ_ܧܰܨ as 
well. The untabulated results from these analyses are comparable to those from models (1) to (3). 
18 Please note that the investor protection indicators ܣܵܦܫ, ܷܲܤܮ_ܧܰܨ and ܵܶܣܨܨ_ܧܰܨ are centered around their 
mean values; i.e., base coefficients of ܷܲ, ܦܱܹܰ, ܶܲ_ܴܧܸ and ܧܲܵ_ܴܧܸ are for a country that is average with 
respect to the investor protection variable considered. 
19 The stand-alone coefficients of investor protection are omitted because these are measured at the country level 
and therefore do not display any variation within an analyst-company cluster. 
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reveals that the information value of target price and earnings forecast revisions is 
significantly higher in common law countries than in civil law countries. We consider this 
effect also economically significant because common law origin raises the coefficient of 
target price revisions by as much as 7.8 percentage points on average (model (4)). Compared 
to a civil law country, this corresponds to a factor of 1.65 ((0.12+0.078)/0.12). That is, the 
information value of target price changes, as proxied by stock price reactions, is 
approximately 65% higher in common law countries. For earnings forecast revisions, we 
observe an even stronger increase of information value in common law versus civil law 
countries.  
Interestingly, model (4) further suggests that the market positively reacts to 
recommendation upgrades in civil law countries, whereas such an effect cannot be observed 
in common law countries. In fact, the interaction coefficient of ܷܲ ൈ ܥܱܯܯܱܰ , a 
significant -0.004, more than compensates for the base coefficient of ܷܲ of 0.003.20 Hence, it 
appears that in countries that are regulated to a lesser extent, investors follow stock 
recommendation upgrades at face value, whereas in highly regulated markets, investors 
attribute less information value to upgrades. Based on the fact that stock recommendations 
are often subject to over-optimism because of conflicts of interests (see, e.g., Lin and 
McNichols, 1998; and Michaely and Womack, 1999), recommendation upgrades might 
generally only contain limited information value. Depending on the sophistication of each 
market participant, investors might react to such information in different ways. Malmendier 
and Shanthikumar (2007), for example, report that small investors follow recommendations 
directly, whereas large investors discount potential conflicts of interest. Similarly, investors 
within regulated markets and strong investor protection environments may be more 
sophisticated and more skeptical toward overly optimistic forecasts such as 
recommendation upgrades.  
Overall, our general findings from model (4), in which we use ܥܱܯܯܱܰ  as the 
investor protection measure, are consistent across all alternative measures of investor 
protection (the anti-self dealing index (model (5)) and both de facto measures of law 
enforcement, ܷܲܤܮ_ܧܰܨ  and ܵܶܣܨܨ_ܧܰܨ  (models (6) and (7)). Within all models, the 
information value of target price and earnings forecast revisions, as proxied by the level of 
market reaction, increases with the level of investor protection. These results complement 
                                                     
20 Within untabulated analyses, we alternatively split the sample into common and civil law countries to regress 
the market reaction on all three forecast measures for each sub-sample. Whereas stock prices are positively 
influenced by recommendation upgrades in civil law countries, we do not find such a result in common law 
countries. 
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the findings of Jegadeesh and Kim (2006), who report the highest information value of 
recommendation revisions for U.S. stocks. According to the authors, the most likely 
explanation is that U.S. analysts are more skilled than their peers from other countries. As 
the figures in Table 5 suggest, another reason for the high informativeness of 
recommendations on U.S. stocks could be that forecast revisions issued on U.S. companies 
are of higher value because of better and more effective investor protection rules. Leuz et al. 
(2003) show that companies in countries with developed equity markets and strong investor 
rights are less likely to engage in earnings management. Consequently, we interpret our 
results as an indication that strong investor protection not only leads to higher quality 
earnings, but that this effect translates into more informative analyst research. 
Thus far in our short-term market reaction analyses, we use the analyst-company 
combination to define clusters in which we allow for fixed effects. Although the analyst-
company level is the most granular level we can cluster on and despite the fact that 
preliminary analyses suggest the use of a fixed-effects model, we re-run our major 
regressions using a set of alternative methods.  
Table 6 displays the results from these alternative specifications, applied to the 
investor protection analyses from Table 5. Again, we choose ܥܱܯܯܱܰ  as an investor 
protection measure. Columns (1) and (2) show regression results allowing for analyst fixed 
effects and company fixed effects, respectively. Column (3) contains estimates from an 
analyst-company random effects model estimated via generalized least squares. Fama-
MacBeth estimators from quarterly regressions allowing for analyst-company fixed effects 
are displayed in column (4). As Table 6 reveals, our results are also robust to these 
alternative estimation methods. Irrespective of the model we use, our results show that the 
value of analyst reports significantly depends on the country-specific level of investor 
protection. 
 
3.3. The impact of institutional investors’ regulatory background on analyst report 
informativeness 
With respect to the shareholder structure of a company, several previous studies 
show that high institutional ownership is also associated with a greater informativeness of 
analyst research. This association occurs mainly because analysts are less biased and more 
diligent when covering stocks with high institutional ownership because institutional 
investors are the main consumers of analyst research. Ljungqvist et al. (2007) show that 
analysts’ recommendations (relative to the consensus) are less optimistic when institutional 
19 
 
Table 6: Market reaction to analyst reports and the impact of investor protection - alternative models
Analyst-fixed 
effects
Company-
fixed effects
Analyst-
company-
random 
effects
Fama-
MacBeth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
UP 0.003 *** 0.003 *** 0.003 *** 0.008 ***
(4.6) (4.7) (5.3) (0.0)
DOWN -0.009 *** -0.009 *** -0.009 *** -0.009 ***
(-14.2) (-13.1) (-15.4) (-0.0)
TP_REV 0.126 *** 0.124 *** 0.124 *** 0.062 ***
(52.1) (33.3) (61.1) (0.1)
EPS_REV 0.012 *** 0.012 *** 0.012 *** 0.011 ***
(18.1) (11.4) (19.2) (0.0)
COMMON 0.001 *** -0.001 *** 0.000
(3.4) (-3.9) (0.0)
UP x COMMON -0.004 *** -0.005 *** -0.004 *** -0.002
(-4.9) (-4.9) (-5.1) (-0.0)
DOWN x COMMON 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.002
(0.6) (0.4) (0.5) (-0.0)
TP_REV x COMMON 0.078 *** 0.076 *** 0.078 *** 0.054 ***
(22.8) (15.7) (29.1) (0.1)
EPS_REV x COMMON 0.026 *** 0.025 *** 0.026 *** 0.017 ***
(22.1) (14.4) (25.3) (0.0)
LOG_MKTCAP 0.001 *** 0.001 0.001 *** 0.184 ***
(9.7) (1.2) (10.9) (0.2)
PTBV -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 ***
(-0.8) (-0.7) (-0.7) (0.0)
PRIOR_PERF -0.051 *** -0.053 *** -0.054 *** -0.239 ***
(-55.7) (-34.3) (-70.9) (-0.2)
PRIOR_EVENT -0.001 *** -0.001 -0.001 *** 0.001
(-2.7) (-1.6) (-3.2) (0.0)
Constant -0.009 *** -0.008 -0.007 *** -1.586 ***
(-10.9) (-1.3) (-10.1) (-1.6)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes No
N 628,361 628,361 628,361 628,361
Adj. R2/Overall GLS R2 8.4% 10.0% 7.8% -
F/Wald 560.14 310.07 19,727.57 -
This table shows the regression results of five-day cumulative abnormal returns around the analyst report date on various analyst
revisions and the impact of investor protection, proxied by COMMON, which indicates whether a country has a common-law legal
origin. The data are based on a panel of analyst reports on companies from the U.S., the EU5, Switzerland and Japan over the period
2005 through 2010. UP is a dummy variable indicating whether a stock recommendation is an upgrade relative to the same analyst's
previous rating on the same stock, whereas DOWN is a dummy variable indicating whether a stock recommendation is a downgrade.
TP_REV and EPS_REV measure the percentage change in an analyst's target price or earnings forecast revision, respectively.
LOG_MKTCAP is the natural logarithm of the market capitalization (in millions of U.S. dollars), and PTBV is the price-to-book value
of the subject company on the analyst report research date. PRIOR_PERF is the stock-specific cumulative stock return over the three
months prior to the abnormal return window. PRIOR_EVENT is a dummy variable equal to one in case a report was preceded by a
general meeting, an earnings release call or sales/revenue release within the five days prior to the publication. ASDI, PUBL_ENF and
STAFF_ENF are centered around their mean values; i.e., the base coefficients of UP, DOWN, TP_REV and EPS_REV are for a country
that is "average" with respect to the investor protection variable considered. In models (1) and (2), standard errors are clustered by
analyst and company cluster, respectively. In models (3) and (4), standard errors are clustered by analyst-company cluster. The Fama-
MacBeth estimators in model (4) are based on quarterly regressions allowing for analyst-company fixed effects. Standard errors are
reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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investors are present. At the same time, the authors find that earnings forecasts are more 
accurate and re-ratings are more timely in cases of high institutional ownership. Frankel et al. 
(2006) also acknowledge that the demand for analyst research increases in institutional 
ownership. Following O’Brien and Bhushan (1990), this connection could be attributed to 
fiduciary reasons; in other words, institutional investors require such information as part of 
their investment decision process. Consequently, analyst following increases with 
institutional ownership to fulfill the increased demand for information (see Bhushan, 1989).  
Another aspect is that the information value of analyst reports also depends on the 
quality of inputs that analysts use. The previous literature (see, e.g., Yeo et al., 2002; and 
Velury and Jenkins, 2006) has shown that the quality of reported earnings increases in 
institutional ownership because of better monitoring by institutional investors. 
Consequently, Frankel et al. (2006) state that the informativeness of analyst research and 
financial statements are complements and, additionally, that the information value of 
analyst reports increases with institutional ownership. 
Based on these findings, we acknowledge that the institutional environment, proxied 
by the ownership structure of a company, might also play an important role in the 
information value of analyst research. Because regulatory and institutional environments 
cannot be analyzed separately, we use institutional ownership as a refined classification of 
investor protection. Analyst research could be of higher information value, for example, if 
most shareholders of a company are from strong rather than weak investor protection 
countries. One might argue that investors from highly regulated markets perform 
monitoring tasks more effectively, thus facilitating better analyst research of higher 
information value. Aggarwal et al. (2011) argue that U.S. institutions and institutions from 
highly regulated countries are engaged in improving corporate governance levels in less 
regulated markets, whereas similar efforts cannot be shown for institutions from countries 
with weak investor protection. Table 7 is therefore set up as follows: in models (1) and (2), 
we focus on the sub-sample of observations from civil law countries, whereas in models (3) 
and (4), we use observations from common law countries. For both sub-samples, we take 
into account domestic (ܫܱ_ܦܱܯ) and foreign (ܫܱ_ܨܱܴ) institutional ownership, as defined 
previously. By using domestic and foreign institutional ownership within the sub-sample of 
either strong investor protection (such as common law countries) or weak investor 
protection (such as civil law countries), we can proxy for the regulatory background of 
investors. Assume that we focus on the sub-sample of companies from common law 
countries, which basically consists of U.S. and U.K. companies. In this case, the variable 
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Table 7: Market reaction to analyst reports and the regulatory background of institutional investors
IO_DOM IO_FOR IO_DOM IO_FOR
(1) (2) (3) (4)
UP 0.004 *** 0.005 *** 0.000 0.000
(7.0) (7.1) (0.1) (0.3)
DOWN -0.011 *** -0.011 *** -0.011 *** -0.011 ***
(-16.1) (-16.2) (-13.6) (-13.6)
TP_REV 0.109 *** 0.109 *** 0.187 *** 0.187 ***
(46.6) (46.5) (80.5) (80.7)
EPS_REV 0.011 *** 0.012 *** 0.036 *** 0.035 ***
(16.0) (15.9) (37.4) (36.8)
Institutional ownership -0.020 ** -0.025 *** -0.028 *** -0.017 ***
(-2.1) (-5.7) (-9.4) (-3.8)
UP x Institutional ownership 0.001 -0.006 -0.004 0.003
(0.1) (-1.1) (-1.3) (0.6)
DOWN x Institutional ownership -0.011 -0.003 -0.007 ** 0.015 ***
(-0.9) (-0.5) (-2.1) (2.8)
TP_REV x Institutional ownership 0.092 ** 0.098 *** 0.091 *** -0.150 ***
(2.3) (5.5) (9.1) (-8.2)
EPS_REV x Institutional ownership 0.005 0.011 * 0.018 *** -0.055 ***
(0.4) (1.7) (4.3) (-7.3)
LOG_MKTCAP 0.005 *** 0.005 *** 0.004 *** 0.003 ***
(5.0) (5.2) (5.6) (4.4)
PTBV 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.5) (0.5) (-0.9) (-1.0)
PRIOR_PERF -0.047 *** -0.047 *** -0.063 *** -0.063 ***
(-30.9) (-31.2) (-53.2) (-53.3)
PRIOR_EVENT -0.001 *** -0.001 *** 0.000 0.000
(-3.0) (-3.0) (0.5) (0.7)
Constant -0.038 *** -0.041 *** -0.040 *** -0.030 ***
(-4.9) (-5.2) (-5.9) (-4.5)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Analyst-company fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 197,374 197,374 351,192 351,192
Adj. R2 9.0% 9.1% 12.4% 12.4%
F 227.06 228.76 561.62 557.13
COMMON = 0 (civil law) COMMON = 1 (common law)
This table shows the regression results of five-day cumulative abnormal returns around the analyst report date on various analyst
revisions and the impact of institutional ownership in different investor protection environments, proxied by COMMON, which
indicates whether a country has a common-law legal origin. The data are based on a panel of analyst reports on companies from the
U.S., the EU5, Switzerland and Japan over the period 2005 through 2010. Whereas models (1) and (2) are based on the sub-sample of
civil law countries (COMMON=0), models (3) and (4) are based on the sub-sample of common law countries (COMMON=1). IO_DOM
represents holdings by institutions from the same country in which the stock is listed. IO_FOR represents holdings by institutions
from a different country than the country in which the stock is listed. UP is a dummy variable indicating whether a stock
recommendation is an upgrade relative to the same analyst's previous rating on the same stock, whereas DOWN is a dummy variable
indicating whether a stock recommendation is a downgrade. TP_REV and EPS_REV measure the percentage change in an analyst's
target price or earnings forecast revision, respectively. Institutional ownership is a placeholder for the institutional ownership
variable indicated in the column headers. LOG_MKTCAP is the natural logarithm of the market capitalization (in millions of U.S.
dollars), and PTBV is the price-to-book value of the subject company on the analyst report research date. PRIOR_PERF is the stock-
specific cumulative stock return over the three months prior to the abnormal return window. PRIOR_EVENT is a dummy variable
equal to one in case a report was preceded by a general meeting, an earnings release call or sales/revenue release within the five days
prior to the publication. IO_DOM and IO_FOR are centered around their company-quarter means; i.e., base coefficients of UP, DOWN,
TP_REV and EPS_REV are for a company that is "average" with respect to the subject company's ownership variable considered. All
models are estimated allowing for analyst-company and time fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by analyst-company and
reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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capturing domestic institutional ownership (ܫܱ_ܦܱܯ) measures the percentage of investors 
who are also from the U.S. (for U.S. companies) or the U.K. (for U.K. companies) and 
therefore stem from a strong investor protection country as well. In contrast, when 
measuring foreign institutional ownership (ܫܱ_ܨܱܴ) within the sub-sample of common law 
countries, U.S. institutions or U.K. institutions are excluded by definition. Consequently, 
foreign institutional investors will likely be from countries with weaker investor protection.  
First, we focus on domestic ownership ( ܫܱ_ܦܱܯ ) for the two sub-samples of 
companies from civil law countries (model (1)) and companies from common law countries 
(model (3)).21 For civil law countries, we only find weak evidence of an impact of domestic 
ownership on the information value of analyst research because the interaction with target 
price revision is significant at the 5% level only, whereas the interaction with earnings 
revision is insignificant. This result changes completely when focusing on common law 
countries; our results in model (3) show that the information value of target price revisions, 
earnings revisions and recommendation downgrades increases with domestic institutional 
ownership, with the majority of significance levels at 1% or above. We explain these 
differential results between civil and common law countries as follows: for the sub-sample 
of common law countries, domestic investors stem from a highly regulated background 
(namely the U.S. or the U.K.). Because of their background, these investors add to the 
governance and the quality of the financial reporting of a company, which consequently 
leads to the higher informativeness of analyst reports. In contrast, in the sub-sample of civil 
law countries, domestic investors are by definition most likely not from the U.S. or U.K. and 
therefore stem from less regulated countries. Hence, they add less to the governance, the 
reporting quality and ultimately the information value of analyst research.  
Second, we focus on foreign ownership ( ܫܱ_ܨܱܴ ) for the two sub-samples of 
companies from civil law countries (model (2)) and those from common law countries 
(model (4)). With respect to companies from civil law countries, the interaction coefficients 
show that foreign institutional ownership is positively associated with both target price and 
earnings revisions. From the perspective of civil law countries, foreign ownership is likely to 
be synonymous with a strong regulation background of shareholders, which appears to lead 
to improved governance and affects the information environment of a company positively. 
This scenario ultimately increases the information value of analyst research. On the contrary, 
                                                     
21  Please note that ܫܱ_ܦܱܯ  and ܫܱ_ܨܱܴ  are centered around their company-quarter means; i.e., the base 
coefficients of ܷܲ, ܦܱܹܰ, ܶܲ_ܴܧܸ and ܧܲܵ_ܴܧܸ are for a company that is average with respect to the ownership 
variable considered. Because institutional ownership is measured at the company level, the base coefficients 
show variation within an analyst-company cluster and are displayed.  
23 
 
while focusing on the sub-sample of common law countries, an increase in the percentage of 
foreign holdings accompanies a significant decrease in the information value of target price 
revisions, earnings forecast revisions and recommendation downgrades (model (4)). For 
companies from common law countries (the U.S. and U.K.), foreign institutional investors 
are likely to stem from weaker investor protection countries, leading to worse governance 
and a lower quality of financial reporting.  
Within unreported analyses, we also compute identical regressions based on sub-
samples in which high and low regulation environments are derived from our alternative 
regulation measures ܣܵܦܫ, ܷܲܤܮ_ܧܰܨ and ܵܶܣܨܨ_ܧܰܨ.22 Our results are again robust to the 
deployment of these alternative measures. 
Overall, our results contribute to the recent findings by Ferreira et al. (2010) and 
Aggarwal et al. (2011) that also suggest that the overall quality of corporate governance and 
institutional ownership are interrelated. In particular, both studies provide evidence that 
domestic institutions play a dominant role in improving the governance of firms located in 
countries in which strong investor protection rules are in place. In contrast, in weak 
shareholder protection countries, governance improvements can mainly be attributed to 
foreign institutions, especially those from countries with strong shareholder protection.  
 
4. Investor protection, institutional ownership and forecast accuracy 
4.1. The impact of investor protection on forecast accuracy 
In the last section, we have argued that the information value of analyst reports can 
be proxied by the short-term market reaction to analyst recommendation changes, target 
price and earnings forecast revisions (see also Frankel et al., 2006). This argument assumes 
that capital markets are efficient and that each piece of new information (such as an analyst 
forecast revision) is instantaneously impounded into prices. Hence, by measuring the direct 
stock price impact of each new analyst forecast (relative to the previous forecast), it is 
possible to measure the amount of new, relevant information and, hence, the 
informativeness of analyst research. However, one could also argue that analyst research 
adds only a small amount of new information in cases of a very transparent information 
environment and high-quality financial reporting. If this holds true, the stock prices of 
companies in countries with strong investor protection environments would efficiently 
adjust to new information, reducing the added value of analyst research. As Loh and Stulz 
                                                     
22 For this purpose, we separate our sample of analyst reports based on the country medians for each of our 
investor protection variables ܣܵܦܫ, ܷܲܤܮ_ܧܰܨ and ܵܶܣܨܨ_ܧܰܨ. 
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(2011) point out, “It is harder for an analyst to have an influential recommendation when more 
analysts follow a firm…”. Consequently, analysts should matter most when the information 
environment of a company is most uncertain (see, e.g., Lang et al., 2004). Based on this 
reasoning, abnormal returns around the publication of analysts’ forecasts might not be 
useful for measuring the quality and information value of analyst research. As an alternative 
to our previous analyses, we therefore use two additional measures of analyst research 
quality, namely, earnings and target price forecast errors, to measure the informativeness of 
analyst research.  
Our objective is to assess whether the differential market reactions to analyst reports 
as a function of investor protection are justified by superior analyst performance (i.e., lower 
forecast errors in terms of earnings and target prices). For this purpose, we measure an 
individual analyst’s earnings forecast error as the absolute value of the difference between 
an annual earnings forecast and the actual reported earnings per share for the same fiscal 
year, scaled by the actual reported earnings (ܧܲܵ_ܧܴܴܱܴ_ܾܽݏ).23 Equivalently, our measure 
of target price forecast error is the difference between the target price and the 12-months-
ahead stock price, scaled by the 12-months-ahead stock price (ܶܲ_ܧܴܴܱܴ_ܾܽݏ). Again, this 
percentage deviation is measured in absolute values because we want to measure the error 
regardless of whether it overestimates or underestimates the true stock price. Similar to the 
market reaction models in Section 3, we ignore the 1% and 100% percentiles with respect to 
earnings and target price forecast error to account for potential outliers.  
Within this section, we regress each of the two forecast error variables on investor 
protection to analyze whether the regulatory environment has an impact on analysts’ 
forecast errors. This approach is therefore analogous to our analyses from the previous 
section in which we applied a similar setup but used the short-term market reaction as the 
dependent variable. As before, we include the same set of control variables at the company 
level and year dummies. In contrast to the market reaction models in which we accounted 
for analyst-company fixed effects, we now deploy an analyst fixed effects model and cluster 
standard errors accordingly.24 The results are displayed in Table 8. Whereas in models (1) to 
(4) we focus on earnings forecast errors, target price forecast errors are used as the 
dependent variable in models (5) to (8). Within these two sets of models, the analyses only 
                                                     
23 This measure quantifies the error at the end of each fiscal year, regardless of whether the actual reported 
earnings are above or below their forecasts.  
24 With analyst-company or company fixed effects, we would be unable to estimate the investor protection 
coefficient because there is no variation in this variable within an analyst-company cluster. 
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differ with respect to the four investor protection measures we deploy, namely, ܥܱܯܯܱܰ, 
ܣܵܦܫ, ܷܲܤܮ_ܧܰܨ and ܵܶܣܨܨ_ܧܰܨ.25  
With regard to Table 8, the results across the two different forecast measures and the 
different investor protection proxies show quite uniformly that analysts’ forecasts are 
significantly more accurate in strong protection environments. For almost all models, the 
forecast errors are negatively associated with the respective investor protection measure and 
highly significant at the 1% level.26 Our results show, taking as an example model (1) of 
Table 8, that the earnings forecast error within common law countries is about 10 percentage 
points lower compared to the forecast error in civil law countries. In unreported analyses, 
we additionally enlarged our forecast error models by broker- and analyst-level control 
variables such as broker size, local broker, star-analyst and additional variables measuring 
the analyst-specific effort in terms of the number of companies and countries that each 
analyst must cover. All results are robust to this alternative model setup. 
 
4.2. The impact of institutional investors’ regulatory background on forecast accuracy 
Comparable to Table 7 that uses market reactions to measure the information value 
of analyst research, we similarly examine whether the regulatory background of 
institutional investors of a company matters to the informativeness of forecasts (in terms of 
accuracy). Analysts’ forecasts might be of higher accuracy and higher information value if 
most investors are from strong rather than weak investor protection countries. We therefore 
refine our investor protection classification based on institutional ownership. Table 9 focuses 
on earnings forecast errors (models (1) to (4)) and target price forecast errors (models (5) to 
(8)). For simplicity, we describe the model setup for earnings forecast errors, displayed in 
columns (1) to (4). Whereas models (1) and (2) are based on the civil law sub-sample, models 
(3) and (4) are based on the common law sub-sample.27 Based on each sub-sample, we 
regress the forecast error on either domestic (ܫܱ_ܦܱܯ) or foreign (ܫܱ_ܨܱܴ) institutional 
ownership, respectively. As before, by using both domestic and foreign ownership within 
either strong or weak investor protection environments, we can proxy for the regulatory 
background of investors. Whereas domestic investors in strong investor protection countries 
                                                     
25 The number of observations in these models is slightly smaller than in the market reaction models because of 
data constraints at the end of the chosen period. With regard to earnings forecast accuracy, we include all 
observations for which actual earnings were available as per December 2010. With regard to target price accuracy, 
we include all relevant observations using research data until July 2010 because we obtained the latest stock price 
information as of July 2011. 
26 This result is supported by six out of eight models. Only the coefficient on ܷܲܤܮ_ܧܰܨ is not negatively 
associated with forecast errors. 
27 The target price models (models (5) to (8)) are organized correspondingly. 
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are by definition likely to stem from strong protection environments as well, foreign 
investors are likely to be located in less regulated backgrounds. An analogous reasoning 
applies to weak investor protection countries. 
Describing our results, we again refer for simplicity to models (1) to (4), which focus 
on earnings forecast errors. First, we concentrate on domestic ownership (ܫܱ_ܦܱܯ) for both 
sub-samples (model (1) for civil law countries and model (3) for common law countries). 
Whereas model (1) reveals that in weak protection countries, high domestic ownership is 
positively associated with earnings forecast errors, model (3) contrarily shows that in strong 
protection countries, forecast errors are lower when domestic ownership is high. We 
interpret this result as follows. Within common law countries, domestic investors add to 
governance and the quality of financial reporting because of their strong investor protection 
backgrounds, which ultimately leads to more accurate forecasts. On the contrary, domestic 
investors within civil law countries do not exercise such an added value in terms of 
governance and, hence, do not positively affect forecast accuracy. Barniv et al. (2005) state 
that whereas analysts provide highly accurate forecasts in common law countries, the 
demand for earnings information and consequently the accuracy of earnings forecasts is 
lower in civil law countries because of weaker governance mechanisms and a lower quality 
of financial reporting. 
Second, we concentrate on foreign ownership ( ܫܱ_ܨܱܴ ) for both sub-samples 
(model (2) for civil law countries and model (4) for common law countries). Quite 
interestingly, model (4) reveals that foreign investors within strong investor protection 
countries lead to higher forecast errors. This result could be linked to the regulatory 
background of these investors, which most likely stem from less regulated countries because 
they are by definition not from the U.S. or U.K. Similar results can be found when 
concentrating on models (5) to (8), in which target price errors are used as dependent 
variables.28  
With regard to the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts, our results overall are in line with 
those for the short-term market reactions. Hence, the informativeness of analyst research as 
proxied by these two measures depends on the overall regulatory environment of a country 
and the investor-specific regulatory background. 
 
                                                     
28 Please note that we also perform additional analyses in which we split the total sample into sub-samples based 
on the alternative investor protection variables ܣܵܦܫ, ܷܲܤܮ_ܧܰܨ and ܵܶܣܨܨ_ܧܰܨ. Results are similar to those 
presented based on a split into common and civil law countries. 
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5. Conclusion 
This paper addresses the question to what extent the regulatory environment of a 
company determines the informativeness of sell-side analyst reports. Based on the previous 
literature showing that the prevailing level of investor protection is positively associated 
with the quality of financial reporting (see, e.g., La Porta et al., 2000; Ball et al., 2000; and 
Leuz et al., 2003) we follow Frankel et al.’s (2006) argument that analyst research and 
financial statements are complements. This association may be linked to the fact that 
analysts directly depend on the quality of information available to them when publishing 
research. In our paper, we analyze whether the informativeness of analyst research is 
affected by (i) the overall level of investor protection of a country and (ii) the regulatory 
background of the institutional investors of a company. To measure the information value of 
analyst research, we apply two different methods. First, we focus on the short-term market 
reaction around the publication of an analyst report. Hence, we assume that markets are 
efficient and prices adjust to each new piece of information, such as an update of analysts’ 
forecasts. By measuring the amount of price reaction around the publication of an analyst 
report, one can proxy the information value of new information. Second, we use report-
specific forecast errors (in terms of earnings and target price forecasts) to identify which 
forecasts are, ex post, more accurate and therefore contain more information value.  
To measure the regulatory environment, we use different measures of protection at 
the country level to proxy for the overall trustworthiness of the financial system. Investor 
protection is evaluated based on four different measures, including the common versus civil 
law classification, the anti-self dealing index of Djankov et al. (2008), and two de facto 
measures of law enforcement from Leuz et al. (2003) and Jackson and Roe (2009). 
With respect to our first measure of informativeness, namely the short-term market 
reaction, our results show an increase in the information value of analysts’ target prices and 
earnings forecasts as the level of investor protection increases. We further show that the 
informativeness of analyst research also depends on the regulatory background of 
institutional investors. Our results suggest that the information value of forecasts increases 
(decreases) if most institutional investors stem from strong (weak) investor protection 
countries as governance efforts and the quality of financial reporting increases (decreases). 
This scenario ultimately leads to an increased (decreased) information value of analysts’ 
forecasts. Aggarwal et al. (2011) have just recently shown that U.S. institutions and 
institutions from countries with high regulatory environments are primarily responsible for 
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improvements in governance, whereas this is not the case for institutions from countries 
with weak investor protection environments. 
With respect to the second measure of informativeness, namely the report-specific 
forecast error, our findings are qualitatively comparable. In particular, our results reveal that 
earnings and target price forecast errors are significantly lower in strong protection 
countries than in weak protection countries. This result further supports prior findings 
showing that strong accounting standard enforcement leads to more accurate earnings 
forecasts (see, e.g., Hope, 2003). Furthermore, within refined analyses, we show that 
forecasts are more (less) accurate when institutional investors are likely to stem from strong 
(weak) investor protection countries. The regulatory background of investors again appears 
to translate into governance efforts, the quality of financial reporting and, finally, the 
information value of forecasts.  
Overall, we show that the informativeness of analyst research depends on the 
regulatory environment of a company and the regulatory background of investors. Our 
results might motivate regulators to establish and guard strong investor protection 
environments because these environments lead to a higher quality of financial disclosure 
and a higher informativeness of analyst research, which ultimately helps investors. 
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Abstract 
In this paper we explore how the 2008 financial crisis impacted sell-side analysts’ 
research as well as the market reactions to the publication of such research. Based on over 
350,000 analyst reports from 2005 to 2010, we find that during the crisis analysts only 
disproportionately adapted their expectations, relative to the stock market development. 
Overall, they maintained a positive view towards corporate performance and stock returns. 
Consequently, analysts’ accuracy with respect to target prices and earnings forecasts 
significantly deteriorated during the sub-period October 2007 to March 2009, leaving their 
research output (ex-post) less reliable to investors. Strikingly though, investors’ responses to 
target price and earnings forecast revisions were significantly stronger and more persistent 
during than outside the crisis. We conclude that investors relied most on analysts when they 
should have done so least. 
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1. Introduction 
It is widely accepted in the prior literature that the dissemination of sell-side analysts’ 
research reports generally triggers significant market reactions (see Stickel, 1995; Womack, 
1996; Brav and Lehavy, 2003 and Asquith et al., 2005, among others). It is reasonable to 
assume, however, that the incremental information investors can derive from analyst reports 
depends on the information environment and, therefore, on the stock market cycle.1 It could 
well be, for example, that in times of stable market conditions and high predictability with 
respect to corporate performance, stock price movements and overall economic conditions, 
investors are rather confident to make investment decisions with only limited external 
advice so that market reactions to analyst research are only modest. On the contrary, when 
markets are volatile, stock returns display unexpected patterns and insecurity is high, 
investors are likely to be in desperate need for valuable information and could therefore be 
forced to put relatively more weight on expert opinions published, for instance, via analyst 
reports. 
Yet in such situations of high insecurity, the quality of analyst research is 
questionable for a variety of reasons. First, analysts themselves depend on the validity of 
corporate information and the predictability of industry or country specific market 
developments as well as global macro-economic trends when deriving earnings estimates or 
assessing the return prospects of stocks. If they lack confidence in what is going to happen, 
their research is going to be of worse quality compared to times during which they have a 
good feeling for the short- and mid-term behavior of capital markets. In line with this 
argumentation Loh and Mian (2003) report the largest earnings forecast errors by 
Singaporean analysts during the 1997/98 Asian economic crisis. Consistently, Sidhu and 
Tan (2011) show that sell-side analysts’ forecast accuracy for U.S. and Australian companies 
significantly deteriorated during the 2008 global financial crisis. Moreover, analysts might be 
particularly prone to issue overly favorable research in order to curry management favor 
when the demand for high-quality research is extraordinarily high. Empirical support in this 
direction comes from Das et al. (1998) and Lim (2001) who provide evidence that analysts 
issue particularly optimistic views on firms the earnings of which are difficult to predict. 
Second, analysts have been shown to overreact to positive information but to underreact to 
negative information (Easterwood and Nutt, 1999). Remarkably, Loh and Mian (2003) 
                                                     
1 Frankel et al. (2006) report that analyst research is more informative when uncertainty among investors is high, 
whereas it turns out to be less informative when the provision of private information is particularly costly. In 
particular, regarding corporate financial information as a major input to analyst research, the authors state that 
“the informativeness of analyst research and informativeness of financial statements are complements.” 
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demonstrate that this was actually the case during, but not before, the 1997/98 Asian 
economic crisis. In addition, they find that analysts’ earnings forecasts during the crisis 
displayed a systematic upside bias.  
These considerations and empirical findings illustrate the potential dilemma in 
which investors might be caught in times of volatile market conditions. They presumably 
depend most heavily on reliable information from external sources when sell-side research, 
one of the major sources of investment advice, runs a high risk of being of particularly poor 
quality.2 Does that mean that investors are caught between the devil and the deep blue sea? 
The latest global economic crisis that shook the markets between late 2007 and early 
2009 and which culminated in the insolvency of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 
provides a natural and up-to-date setting that allows addressing several aspects concerning 
the quality and market impact of analyst reports in different market environments 
empirically. We define October 10, 2007 as the starting point of the financial crisis because 
this is the day on which the Dow Jones total return index started to decline after reaching its 
peak the day before. Analogously, March 09, 2009 marks the end of the crisis period since 
the index reached its nadir on that day. Figure 1 provides an illustration of the development 
of the stock market during the entire sample period with respect to the Dow Jones index 
value (solid line) and its return volatility, measured as the standard deviation over the 
previous 30 trading days (dashed line). 
This paper adds to the literature in two major ways. First, we provide insights on 
how analysts’ target price and earnings forecast accuracy as well as the optimism inherent to 
their forecasts during the downturn differed from the times before and after the crisis. 
Second, we address the question whether and to what extent the strength of investor 
reactions to analyst research depends on the economic cycle. Answering these two questions 
simultaneously will allow us to draw initial conclusions on whether investors were aware of 
potential crisis-induced differences in the quality of analyst research. 
Concerning the first contribution of this paper (analysts’ performance), the results 
suggest that analysts generally did react to the 2008 financial crisis by nominally adjusting 
their expectations downward. In particular, they issued relatively fewer buy and more sell 
recommendations, along with negative earnings forecast and target price revisions, during 
the crisis. Before and after the crisis the proportion of buy recommendations was higher and 
average earnings and target price revisions had a positive sign. These insights draw an 
                                                     
2 In fact, Ryan and Taffler (2004) document that analysts’ output is one of the most important factors associated 
with abnormal stock price movements and trading volumes. 
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incomplete picture, however. Despite the downward adjustments of their expectations, 
analysts’ accuracy with respect to target prices and earnings forecasts deteriorated 
significantly during the crisis. Consequently, the average decline in stock prices and 
corporate earnings must have been even larger than analysts had expected. Furthermore, 
although analysts’ systematically overestimated both stock prices and earnings during the 
entire sample period, the magnitudes of the average target price and earnings forecast errors 
were much larger during than outside the crisis. That is, analysts were apparently too 
optimistic overall, but particularly so when markets tumbled. These findings are consistent 
with those reported by, e.g., Loh and Mian (2003) and Sidhu and Tan (2011).  
With respect to the second aspect (stock market reactions), we strikingly find that the 
cumulative abnormal returns in response to stock recommendation downgrades as well as 
analysts’ target price and earnings forecast revisions were significantly higher during the 
crisis than in non-crisis times, implying that investors relied significantly more on external 
advice when insecurity about the stock market was high. Moreover, analyses on the post-
announcement stock price performance suggest that the market reactions to revisions of 
both target prices and earnings forecasts in times of crisis were permanent and increased 
gradually. That is, these revisions conveyed new information to the market, although the 
market was not fully efficient in assimilating the new information into stock prices. During 
Figure 1: Dow Jones total return index 2005-2010
This figure illustrates how the Dow Jones total return index evolved over the sample period (January 01, 2005 to November 30, 2010).
The index value is indexed to 100 on the first day of the sample period. On each day, the 30-day volatility is the standard deviation of
index returns over the previous 30 trading days. The vertical lines mark the beginning (October 10, 2007) and the end (March 09,
2009) of the financial crisis period as defined in this paper.
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non-crisis times, in contrast, the initial market reactions were lower and even partly reversed 
subsequent to the publication of the report, suggesting that some of the short-term reaction 
was due to investors’ overreaction.3 
The bottom line of our results is that sell-side analysts had the strongest and longest-
lasting impact on stock returns during the crisis, that is, when the quality of their reports 
was lowest. It seems that investors were desperately longing for reliable investment advice 
during the crisis. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the data sources 
and variables used. Empirical results concerning the crisis impact on analysts’ behavior and 
performance are presented in Section 3. Section 4 evaluates whether investor reactions to 
analyst research during the crisis differed from the reactions in non-crisis times. Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. Data sample 
2.1. Data sources and definition of variables 
Our study is based on analyst report information on U.S. companies from January 
2005 to November 2010, obtained from FactSet Research Systems, Inc. We include all 
companies that received forecasts from at least three different analysts in at least one of the 
calendar years in the sample period. For each analyst report in the sample we obtain basic 
report information including the report date, the analyst’s name (if available) and the name 
of the issuing broker, along with the stock recommendation level, the target price, the 
forecasted earnings per share for the upcoming fiscal year end and the stock price as of the 
trading day prior to the report date.4 If a report was published within 90 days after the same 
analyst’s previous report on the same company, we further check whether the current stock 
recommendation represents an upgrade (ܷܲܩܴܣܦܧ ), a reiteration (ܴܧܫܶܧܴܣܶܫܱܰሻ  or a 
downgrade (ܦܱܹܰܩܴܣܦܧ).5 We also calculate the percentage changes in an analyst’s target 
                                                     
3 We emphasize that we do not intent to judge on whether market reactions to the dissemination of analyst 
reports during or outside the crisis represented rational behavior or not. Our aim is to draw an ex-post picture in 
order to better understand how different market environments affect market participants’ behavior. 
4 To ensure consistency we consider all stock recommendations with a FactSet rating equal to 1 (typically a strong 
buy) or 1.5 (typically a buy) as buy recommendations (ܤܷܻ). Similarly, if the FactSet recommendation is 2.5 
(typically a sell) or 3 (typically a strong sell), we record these as sell recommendations (ܵܧܮܮ). Finally, a 2 is 
considered a hold recommendation (ܪܱܮܦ). 
5 We follow the recent literature standard (e.g., Asquith et al., 2005) and use dummy variables to code stock 
recommendation revisions because the different recommendation levels are not uniformly defined across 
brokerage houses. 
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price (ܶܲ_ܴܧܸ) and earnings forecast (ܧܲܵ_ܴܧܸ), subject to the same 90-day constraint.6 
Further, we scale the analyst’s current target price and earnings forecast, respectively, by the 
concurrent stock price to measure the analyst’s expectations with regard to future stock 
returns (ܫܯܲܮ_ܴܧܶ) and earnings yield (ܧܲܵ_ܻܫܧܮܦ) as implicitly assumed in her forecasts. 
To assess whether and to what extent analysts over- or underestimated future stock returns 
and future earnings, we also calculate the ex-post percentage errors in an analyst’s target 
price (ܶܲ_%ܧܴܴܱܴ_ܴܧܮ) and earnings forecast (ܧܲܵ_%ܧܴܴܱܴ_ܴܧܮ).7 Finally, the absolute 
values of these deviations (ܶܲ_%ܧܴܴܱܴ_ܣܤܵ and ܧܲܵ_%ܧܴܴܱܴ_ܣܤܵ) measure an analyst’s 
accuracy, irrespective of the direction of the errors. For a report to be included in our 
analyses we require that the revision variables on all summary measures (i.e., 
ܷܲܩܴܣܦܧ/ܴܧܫܶܧܴܣܶܫܱܰ/ ܦܱܹܰܩܴܣܦܧ, ܶܲ_ܴܧܸ and ܧܲܵ_ܴܧܸ) are available. 
Using daily stock and market returns from Datastream, we calculate abnormal stock 
returns around the issuance of an analyst report based on a standard market model (see, e.g., 
Brown and Warner, 1985; MacKinlay, 1997) where the estimation period lasts from day -250 
until day -11, relative to the research date of the analyst report. ܥܣܴሺെ2;൅2ሻ  is the 
cumulative abnormal return for event days -2 to +2 and serves as a measure for the initial 
market reaction around the dissemination of an analyst report. The cumulative abnormal 
returns for alternative event windows, ܥܣܴሺെ2;൅20ሻ  and ܥܣܴሺ൅3;൅20ሻ , are defined 
accordingly. Consistent with prior studies on analyst research and capital markets (e.g., 
Hugon and Muslu, 2010), we drop observations if the stock price on the research date is less 
than or equal to USD 1.00. In order to account for potential outliers, we also ignore 
observations that represent the 1% and 100% percentiles of either ܶܲ_ܴܧܸ , ܧܲܵ_ܴܧܸ , 
ܫܯܲܮ_ܴܧܶ, ܧܲܵ_ܻܫܧܮܦ , ܶܲ_%ܧܴܴܱܴ_ܴܧܮor ܧܲܵ_%ܧܴܴܱܴ_ܴܧܮ because extreme values in 
these variables are potentially due to coding errors in the current (or previous) forecasts. 
Lastly, the 1% and 100% percentiles of ܥܣܴሺെ2;൅20ሻ are ignored to mitigate the effect of 
potential outliers with respect to stock returns. 
To control for a company’s size and growth potential, we next obtain, also from 
Datastream, a company’s market capitalization in million U.S. dollars (ܯܭܶܥܣܲሻ and the 
price-to-book ratio (ܲܶܤܸሻ at the time of the analyst report.8 Observations with a negative 
                                                     
6 ܶܲ_ܴܧܸ is calculated as ሺܶ ௧ܲ െ ܶ ௧ܲିଵሻ ܶ ௧ܲିଵ⁄ , whereas ܧܲܵ_ܴܧܸ is calculated as ሺܧܲ ௧ܵ െ ܧܲ ௧ܵିଵሻ |ܧܲ ௧ܵିଵ|⁄ . ܶ ௧ܲ 
(ܶ ௧ܲିଵ) and ܧܲ ௧ܵ (ܧܲ ௧ܵିଵ) are the current (previous) target price and earnings per share forecast, respectively. 
7 Similar to	ܶܲ_ܴܧܸ and ܧܲܵ_ܴܧܸ, the variable ܶܲ_%ܧܴܴܱܴ_ܴܧܮ is calculated as ሺܶ ௧ܲ െ ௔ܲ௖௧௨௔௟ሻ ௔ܲ௖௧௨௔௟⁄ , whereas 
ܧܲܵ_%ܧܴܴܱܴ_ܴܧܮ  is calculated as ሺܧܲ ௧ܵ െ ܧܲܵ௔௖௧௨௔௟ሻ |ܧܲܵ௔௖௧௨௔௟|⁄ , where ௔ܲ௖௧௨௔௟  and ܧܲܵ௔௖௧௨௔௟  are the actual 
stock price after 12 months and the actual earnings per share in the current (i.e., non-reported) fiscal year as per 
the report date, respectively. 
8 Consistent with the prior literature (e.g., Barber et al., 2006), we use ܮܱܩ_ܯܭܶܥܣܲ , which is the natural 
logarithm of ܯܭܶܥܣܲ, as independent variable in the multivariate analyses. 
7 
 
price-to-book ratio are ignored. From FactSet’s analyst report data we further measure 
broker size by counting the number of different companies followed by the issuing broker 
within a calendar year (ܤܴܱܭܧܴ_ܵܫܼܧ ). On the analyst level, the number of different 
companies followed by an individual analyst (ܣܰܣܮܻܵܶ_ܥܱܯܲ) and the number of different 
countries represented by these companies (ܣܰܣܮܻܵܶ_ܥܱܷܴܰܶሻ serve as proxies for the 
analyst’s workload. Our final dataset consists of 363,779 individual analyst reports of which 
67,045 (18.4%) were published during the crisis period. 
 
2.2. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 provides an overview of the final dataset. As Panel A shows, 58.8% of all 
recommendations belonged to the category ܤܷܻ, whereas ܵܧܮܮ accounted for only 5.3%. A 
comparable imbalance of disproportionately many buys is also documented in Malmendier 
and Shanthikumar (2007) and Barber et al. (2007, 2010). Relative to the prior rating, 
ܷܲܩܴܣܦܧ and ܦܱܹܰܩܴܣܦܧ accounted for 2.3% and 3.0% of the recommendation changes, 
respectively. From Panel B it follows that analysts revised their target prices upward by 0.8% 
on average. The resulting target prices suggested an expected stock price increase, 
ܫܯܲܮ_ܴܧܶ , of 16.1% over the forecasting horizon. The mean of 32.7% with respect to 
ܶܲ_%ܧܴܴܱܴ_ܴܧܮ suggests that actual the stock prices after 12 months, on average, fell 
about one third short of analysts’ price expectations. This is consistent with Bonini et al.’s 
(2010) finding that target prices are upwardly biased. Regardless of the sign of the error, the 
absolute error ܶܲ_%ܧܴܴܱܴ_ܣܤܵ was, on average, as high as 48.9%. As Panel C reveals, the 
distribution of the variables related to analysts’ earnings forecasts was very similar. 
ܧܲܵ_ܴܧܸ , ܧܲܵ_ܻܫܧܮܦ , ܧܲܵ_%ܧܴܴܱܴ_ܴܧܮ  and ܧܲܵ_%ܧܴܴܱܴ_ܣܤܵ  were all positive on 
average, although generally lower in absolute terms. For instance, the mean scaled relative 
and absolute earnings forecast errors (ܧܲܵ_%ܧܴܴܱܴ_ܴܧܮ and ܧܲܵ_%ܧܴܴܱܴ_ܣܤܵ) were 9.2% 
and 23.7%, respectively. Again, these figures are in line with those presented in prior 
research and are almost identical to those in Loh and Mian (2006), who report 10.13% and 
22.69%, respectively, for identically defined variables.9 
Lastly, Panel D of Table 1 provides summary statistics for the set of the above-
mentioned control variables measured at the company and broker/analyst level. 
 
                                                     
9 The number of observations for the error variables based on analysts’ target prices and earnings forecasts are 
smaller than those for the revision and return variables due to data constraints at the end of the sample period. 
Concerning earnings forecast accuracy we include all observations for which actual earnings were available as of 
December 2010. Concerning target price accuracy we include all relevant observations with a research date until 
July, 2010, because we obtained the latest stock price information as of July, 2011. 
8 
 
 
Table 1: Data sample
Panel A: Distribution of stock recommendation revisions
Obs. % of total Median StDev Min Max
Recommendation levels
All recommendations 363,779 100.0%
BUY 213,998 58.8% - - - -
HOLD 130,379 35.8% - - - -
SELL 19,402 5.3% - - - -
Recommendation revisions
All recommendation revisions 363,779 100.0%
UPGRADE 8,508 2.3% - - - -
REITERATION 344,451 94.7% - - - -
DOWNGRADE 10,820 3.0% - - - -
Panel B: Target prices
Obs. Mean Median StDev Min Max
TP_REV 363,779 0.8% 0.0% 9.4% -41.6% 47.1%
IMPL_RET 363,779 16.1% 15.1% 18.1% -46.0% 91.3%
TP_%ERROR_REL 284,118 32.7% 8.5% 90.7% -64.9% 921.9%
TP_%ERROR_ABS 284,118 48.9% 24.1% 83.1% 0.0% 921.9%
Panel C: Earnings forecasts
Obs. Mean Median StDev Min Max
EPS_REV 363,779 0.5% 0.0% 22.2% -187.0% 171.0%
EPS_YIELD 363,779 5.5% 6.0% 5.4% -42.0% 19.6%
EPS_%ERROR_REL 240,900 9.2% -0.7% 52.1% -187.5% 465.0%
EPS_%ERROR_ABS 240,900 23.7% 8.0% 47.3% 0.0% 465.0%
Panel D: Company and broker/analyst fundamentals
Obs. Mean Median StDev Min Max
Company fundamentals
MKTCAP 363,779 14,758 3,660 34,282 11.1 518,242
PTBV 357,955 2.9 2.2 2.5 0.1 21.8
Broker/analyst charateristics
BROKER_SIZE 363,779 799.6 559.0 612.3 1.0 1,923.0
ANALYST_COMP 363,779 15.6 14.0 8.5 1.0 93.0
ANALYST_COUNTR 363,779 1.1 1.0 0.5 1.0 7.0
This table shows summary statistics for the final data sample. Panel A lists the absolute and relative frequencies for each stock
recommendation level and revision category. Panels B and C list summary statistics for variables related to analysts' target prices
and earnings forecasts, respectively. Similarly, Panel C lists summary statistics for a set of company and broker/analyst
characteristics. BUY, HOLD and SELL are dummy variables indicating whether a stock recommendation is a buy, a hold or a sell.
UPGRADE is a dummy variable indicating whether a stock recommendation is an upgrade relative to the same analyst's previous
rating on the same stock, while DOWNGRADE is a dummy variable indicating whether a stock recommendation is a downgrade.
REITERATION is a dummy variable indicating that the current recommendation level represents no change to the analyst's prior
recommendation. TP_REV and EPS_REV measure the percentage change in an analyst's target price or earnings forecast revision.
IMPL_RET and EPS_YIELD are the current target price and earnings forecast scaled by the concurring stock price. TP_%ERROR_REL
and EPS_%ERROR_REL are the ex-post percentage errors of analysts' target price and earnings forecasts. The target price error is
calculated on the basis of a 12-months forecasting horizon, while the earnings forecast error is calculated based on actual earnings in
the corresponding fiscal year. TP_%ERROR_ABS and EPS_%ERROR_ABS are the absolute values of TP_%ERROR_REL and
EPS_%ERROR_REL, respectively. MKTCAP is the market capitalization in million U.S. dollars. PTBV is the price-to-book ratio.
BROKER_SIZE is the number of companies followed by a broker in a calendar year and serves as a proxy for broker
size/reputation. ANALYST_COMP and ANALYST_COUNTR are the number of companies followed by an analyst, and the countries 
represented by them, in a calendar year and serve as proxies for the complexity of an analyst's research portfolio.
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3. The impact of the financial crisis on analysts’ behavior and performance 
Although there is probably little doubt that the stock market crash between late 2007 
and early 2009, along with an increase in return volatility, had a material impact on financial 
experts’ behavior and performance, we provide some detailed and novel insights on 
analysts’ optimism and accuracy in different market environments. To shed light on the 
question how the financial crisis affected sell-side research, we partition the data sample into 
reports issued during the financial crisis and reports issued outside the crisis. Recall that we 
define October 10, 2007 to March 09, 2009 as the crisis period because this is exactly the time 
window when the U.S. stock market fell from its maximum to its minimum value over the 
entire sample period. 
Looking at stock recommendation levels first, Panel A of Table 2 demonstrates that 
the distribution of recommendations was significantly more favorable outside than it was 
during the crisis. In particular, the proportion of buy recommendations fell from 60.0% to 
53.8%, whereas the proportion of hold and sell recommendations increased from 34.9% to 
40.0% and from 5.1% to 6.3%, respectively. Note that these figures are in line with stock 
recommendation distributions reported for economic expansions and recessions by Hess et 
al. (2012). All inter-temporal differences in proportions are significant at the 1% level. With 
respect to recommendation changes, the figures further reveal that during the financial crisis 
analysts changed their prior rating levels more often than they did outside the crisis period, 
relative to the total number of reports issued, since the proportion of reiterations went down 
from 95.0% to 93.2%. At the same time, the proportion of upgrades increased from 2.2% to 
2.9%, whereas the number of downgrades increased from 2.8% to 3.9%. Again, all 
proportions are significantly different during versus outside the crisis at the 1% level. A 
likely explanation for the increase in the proportion of recommendation upgrades and 
downgrades is that during the crisis analysts themselves were subject to increased insecurity 
so that it was particularly challenging for them to derive valid recommendations at all. 
Moreover, note that the increase in downgrades was considerably larger than the increase in 
upgrades. Thus, downgrades became relatively more prevalent, which is consistent with a 
more prudent distribution of stock recommendations during the crisis. 
With respect to target prices, Panel B of Table 2 reveals that during the crisis analysts 
adjusted their expectations downward by -3.5% on average, whereas in non-crisis times, 
they increased their prior estimates by 1.7%. This suggests that analysts responded to the 
downward trend in stock prices by adjusting their target prices in the same direction. 
Remarkably, though, these adjustments seem to have been disproportionate and lower than 
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the decline in stock prices, as the average implied return during the crisis (20.3%) was 
significantly higher than outside the crisis (15.2%). 10  Consequently, although analysts 
generally lowered their target prices during the financial crisis in absolute terms, they 
implicitly communicated more optimistic return expectations to the market. This finding is 
                                                     
10 Recall that the return forecast ܫܯܲܮ_ܴܧܶ is calculated as the analyst’s target price scaled by the concurrent 
stock price. Hence, an increase in ܫܯܲܮ_ܴܧܶ  despite downward target price revisions suggests that the 
corresponding stock price decline must have been even larger in magnitude. 
Table 2: Analysts' expectations and performance in crisis and non-crisis times
Panel A: Distribution of stock recommendation revisions
Full sample No Crisis Crisis No Crisis - Crisis
Obs. % of total Obs. % of total Obs. % of total % of total
Recommendation levels
All recommendations 363,779 296,734 67,045
BUY 213,998 58.8% 177,959 60.0% 36,039 53.8% 6.2% +++
HOLD 130,379 35.8% 103,590 34.9% 26,789 40.0% -5.0% +++
SELL 19,402 5.3% 15,185 5.1% 4,217 6.3% -1.2% +++
Recommendation revisions
All recommendation revisions 363,779 296,734 67,045
UPGRADE 8,508 2.3% 6,582 2.2% 1,926 2.9% -0.7% +++
REITERATION 344,451 94.7% 281,940 95.0% 62,511 93.2% 1.8% +++
DOWNGRADE 10,820 3.0% 8,212 2.8% 2,608 3.9% -1.1% +++
Panel B: Target prices
Full sample No Crisis Crisis No Crisis - Crisis
Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Mean
TP_REV 363,779 0.8% 296,734 1.7% 67,045 -3.5% 5.2% ***
IMPL_RET 363,779 16.1% 296,734 15.2% 67,045 20.3% -5.1% ***
TP_%ERROR_REL 284,118 32.7% 218,678 16.2% 65,440 87.5% -71.3% ***
TP_%ERROR_ABS 284,118 48.9% 218,678 34.1% 65,440 98.6% -64.5% ***
Panel C: Earnings forecasts
Full sample No Crisis Crisis No Crisis - Crisis
Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Mean
EPS_REV 363,779 0.5% 296,734 1.3% 67,045 -3.1% 4.5% ***
EPS_YIELD 363,779 5.5% 296,734 5.3% 67,045 6.6% -1.3% ***
EPS_%ERROR_REL 240,900 9.2% 174,675 5.1% 66,225 19.9% -14.8% ***
EPS_%ERROR_ABS 240,900 23.7% 174,675 21.0% 66,225 30.8% -9.8% ***
This table shows univariate tests of differences in analysts' expectations and performance between crisis and non-crisis times. In Panel A,
the proportions of the different recommendation levels and revisions are compared. In Panels B and C, the mean values of the variables
related to analysts' target prices and earnings forecasts are compared. BUY, HOLD and SELL are dummy variables indicating whether a
stock recommendation is a buy, a hold or a sell. UPGRADE is a dummy variable indicating whether a stock recommendation is an
upgrade relative to the same analyst's previous rating on the same stock, while DOWNGRADE is a dummy variable indicating whether
a stock recommendation is a downgrade. REITERATION is a dummy variable indicating that the current recommendation level
represents no change to the analyst's prior recommendation. TP_REV and EPS_REV measure the percentage change in an analyst's target
price or earnings forecast revision. IMPL_RET and EPS_YIELD are the current target price and earnings forecast scaled by the concurring
stock price. TP_%ERROR_REL and EPS_%ERROR_REL are the ex-post percentage errors of analysts' target price and earnings forecasts.
The target price error is calculated on the basis of a 12-months forecasting horizon, while the earnings forecast error is calculated based
on actual earnings in the corresponding fiscal year. TP_%ERROR_ABS and EPS_%ERROR_ABS are the absolute values of
TP_%ERROR_REL and EPS_%ERROR_REL, respectively. Based on a t-test (z-test), ***, ** and * (+++, ++ and +) denote statistical
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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further substantiated by the fact that target prices that were issued during the crisis overshot 
the actual stock prices twelve months later by as much as 87.5%, while the average over-
optimism before or after the crisis was only 16.2%. In absolute terms as well, analyst’s target 
prices were significantly farther away from the actual stock price 12 months later when the 
target was issued during the crisis. All differences between the crisis and non-crisis averages 
in the variables related to an analyst’s target price are statistically significant at the 1%-
level.11 
Panel C of Table 2 provides very comparable results concerning analysts’ earnings 
forecasts. The average revision was 1.3% outside the crisis but -3.1% during the downturn. 
At the same time, the average earnings yield was 6.6% during the crisis, which is 1.3 
percentage points higher than the corresponding value from the non-crisis period. Thus, 
analysts became even more optimistic in relative terms, which is consistent with the finding 
on target prices and stock return expectations discussed above.12 Finally, the scaled relative 
and absolute earnings forecast errors increased from 5.1% to 19.9% and from 21.0% to 30.8%, 
respectively, during the crisis. Again, all crisis versus non-crisis differences are highly 
significant. 
The results thus far demonstrate that the 2008 financial crisis had a substantial effect 
on the quality of sell-side analyst research. Although analysts adjusted their expectations 
downward in terms of recommendation level, target price or earnings forecast, the return 
prospects inherent to their expectations grew even higher in times of economic turmoil. At 
the same time, their forecast accuracy with respect to target prices and earnings per share 
declined significantly. Hence, analysts were either unable or unwilling to assess the full 
impact of the world economic crisis. Admittedly, one can argue that economic downturns 
are, by their very nature, typically accompanied by an increase in return volatility so that it 
is hardly surprising that analysts were less accurate during the crisis. However, the prior 
literature provides several other arguments which help explain the fact that during the crisis 
analysts’ forecast accuracy not only deteriorated in absolute terms, but that they were 
systematically more optimistic. First, Das et al. (1998) and Lim (2001) demonstrate that 
                                                     
11 Our sample contains observations which could have a distorting effect on the target price error variables, due 
to the 12-months forecasting horizon. In particular, there are instances where the research date on which a target 
price was issued is before (during) the crisis, whereas the errors are calculated based on actual stock prices 
during (after) the crisis. In untabulated results we therefore exclude analyst reports issued between October 07, 
2006 and October 06, 2007 (the year before the start of the crisis) or between March 10, 2008 and March 09, 2009 
(the last year of the crisis). With this alternative specification, our results remain qualitatively unchanged. 
12 Since ܧܲܵ_ܻܫܧܮܦ is calculated as the outstanding earnings forecast scaled by the concurrent stock price, an 
increase in ܧܲܵ_ܻܫܧܮܦ, given a downward revision of the earnings forecasts, must be explained by an even 
larger decline of the concurring stock price. 
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information uncertainty concerning corporate earnings is a driver of analysts’ optimism. Not 
only was the crisis characterized by an increased volatility of stock returns and earnings. 
Companies might also have contributed to this uncertainty by responding to the 2008 
turmoil with a more restrictive release of valuable information such as interim earnings 
guidance. Exemplarily, in early 2009 Unilever decided to stop publishing financial targets 
due to the volatile market environment in those days (see, e.g., The Economist, 2009; Rigby 
and Wiggins, 2009). It could be that analysts had incentives to be particularly optimistic 
during that time in order to foster management relationships and gain access to private 
information. A second argument stems from the behavioral finance literature and stipulates 
that financial analysts are subject to behavioral biases. According to Easterwood and Nutt 
(1999), analysts overreact to good news, whereas they underreact to bad news. Applying 
this logic to the 2008 economic crisis, the collapse of the stock market and negative earnings 
surprises can be considered bad news that led to disproportionate adjustments of analysts’ 
expectations. What is remarkable in this context is that analysts are thought of as very 
sophisticated financial intermediaries with a significant impact on investment decisions. As 
Loh and Mian (2003) point out, “professional security analysts, arguably amongst the most astute 
of market participants, exhibit systematic biases in forming their expectations during periods of 
heightened economic uncertainty. This calls into question the classical assumption about the 
rationality of the marginal investor.” 
 
4. The impact of the financial crisis on stock market reactions to analyst research 
4.1. Univariate analysis of short-term abnormal returns 
The results presented thus far give rise to the question whether investors reacted 
differently to the dissemination of analyst research, depending on the market phase in 
which this research was published. On the one hand, analyst research during the crisis was, 
from an ex-post perspective, of poorer quality. It could have therefore been recommendable 
for investors to rely less on analyst reports in those days. On the other hand, investors 
themselves were also subject to the financial market turmoil, so it was arguably particularly 
challenging for them to draw reliable inferences on the returns prospects of firms and stocks. 
As a consequence, they might have been in desperate need for external advice. Hence, there 
are two contrarian effects: The reduced quality of analysts’ forecasts, conditional on 
investors being aware of this loss of quality, could have mitigated the market reactions in 
response to the dissemination of analyst research, whereas a potentially higher demand for  
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external advice during the crisis could have led to more emphasized market reactions in the 
direction of the analysts’ opinions.13 
Table 3 provides initial insights how the 2008 financial crisis impacted short-term 
stock price reactions to analyst reports. We contrast the cumulative abnormal returns over 
the (-2;+2) window during the crisis versus the non-crisis period for different levels of 
analysts’ stock recommendations as well as recommendation changes and revisions to their 
target prices and earnings forecasts. 
The table reveals that in either market environment the short-term market reactions 
ܥܣܴሺെ2;൅2ሻ  to positive news (buy recommendations, recommendation upgrades and 
positive target price or earnings forecast revisions) were positive, whereas the cumulative 
abnormal returns to pessimistic analyst opinions (sell recommendations, recommendation 
downgrades and negative change in target price or earnings forecasts) were negative. 
Moreover, the average market reactions were stronger during the crisis for the 
majority of variables considered. The average ܥܣܴሺെ2;൅2ሻ were particularly strong when 
                                                     
13 Hess et al. (2012) use a similar argument when interpreting their findings of stronger short-term abnormal 
returns to stock recommendations during economic recessions compared to economic expansions. In particular, 
they attribute this observation to the “heightened volatility and general uncertainty during these times.” 
Table 3: Average cumulative abnormal returns in crisis and non-crisis times
Full sample No Crisis Crisis No Crisis - Crisis
Recommendation levels
BUY 0.1% *** 0.1% *** 0.1% ** 0.0%
HOLD -0.4% *** -0.3% *** -0.7% *** 0.3% ***
SELL -0.9% *** -0.7% *** -1.3% *** 0.6% ***
Recommendation revisions
UPGRADE 1.8% *** 1.9% *** 1.5% *** 0.4% **
REITERATION -0.1% *** -0.0% *** -0.2% *** 0.1% ***
DOWNGRADE -3.0% *** -2.7% *** -4.1% *** 1.4% ***
Target price revisions
TP_REV>0 2.0% *** 1.9% *** 3.1% *** -1.2% ***
TP_REV=0 -0.1% *** -0.2% *** 0.3% *** -0.5% ***
TP_REV<0 -3.1% *** -3.4% *** -2.7% *** -0.7% ***
Earnings forecast revisions
EPS_REV>0 1.4% *** 1.2% *** 2.3% *** -1.1% ***
EPS_REV=0 0.1% *** 0.1% *** -0.5% *** 0.6% ***
EPS_REV<0 -2.0% *** -1.9% *** -2.1% *** 0.2% ***
This table shows univariate tests of differences in five-day cumulative abnormal returns around the analyst report date between crisis
and non-crisis times for different levels and changes in major analyst report measures. BUY, HOLD and SELL are dummy variables
indicating whether a stock recommendation is a buy, a hold or a sell. UPGRADE is a dummy variable indicating whether a stock
recommendation is an upgrade relative to the same analyst's previous rating on the same stock, while DOWNGRADE is a dummy
variable indicating whether a stock recommendation is a downgrade. REITERATION is a dummy variable indicating that the current
recommendation level represents no change to the analyst's prior recommendation. TP_REV and EPS_REV measure the percentage
change in an analyst's target price or earnings forecast revision. Based on a t-test, ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% level, respectively.
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sell recommendations, recommendation downgrades, positive target price revisions or 
positive or negative earnings forecast revisions were issued during the crisis. For example, 
the ܥܣܴሺെ2;൅2ሻ for recommendation downgrades was -2.7% in non-crisis times but -4.1% 
during the crisis. These crisis versus non-crisis differences are statistically significant at 5% 
or above. Although the findings on negative target price revisions are an exception which 
contradicts these initial results, the overall picture presented in Table 3 provides evidence 
that the intensity of the market reactions to the dissemination of analyst reports depends on 
the overall economic conditions in a sense that stock market reactions to such reports are 
more pronounced in times of crisis. 
 
4.2. Multivariate analysis of short-term abnormal returns 
Prior research has shown that analysts’ recommendation changes, target price and 
earnings forecast revisions all have incremental and simultaneous impact on abnormal stock 
returns (e.g., Asquith et al., 2005). In order to separate the crisis impact on each individual 
type of analyst revision and to draw valid inferences on market responses to analyst 
research in different economic environments, we present additional results from standard 
OLS regressions with ܥܣܴሺെ2;൅2ሻ as the dependent variable in Table 4. Following the 
recent market reactions literature, we include ܷܲܩܴܣܦܧ , ܦܱܹܰܩܴܣܦܧ , ܶܲ_ܴܧܸ  and 
ܧܲܵ_ܴܧܸ as the typical analyst research-related measures that have been shown to drive 
abnormal stock returns (see, e.g., Francis and Soffer, 1997; Brav and Lehavy, 2003; Asquith et 
al., 2005). We also include ܮܱܩ_ܯܭܶܥܣܲ , ܲܶܤܸ , ܤܴܱܭܧܴ_ܵܫܼܧ , ܣܰܣܮܻܵܶ_ܥܱܯܲ  and 
ܣܰܣܮܻܵܶ_ܥܱܷܴܰܶ as control variables at the company and broker/analyst level in order to 
capture any effect that is not associated with any of the analyst report metrics listed above.14 
Column 1 of Table 4 contains the regression results for the sub-sample of analyst reports that 
were published outside the 2007-2009 financial crisis, whereas the results for the crisis sub-
sample are displayed in column 2. Lastly, column 3 is based on the entire sample of analyst 
reports. Here, we further include the interaction terms of ܷܲܩܴܣܦܧ, ܦܱܹܰܩܴܣܦܧ, ܶܲ_ܴܧܸ 
and ܧܲܵ_ܴܧܸ with ܥܴܫܵܫܵ, a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if an analyst report was 
issued between October 10, 2007 and March 09, 2009, and 0 otherwise, in order 
systematically assess the differential impact the crisis had on market responses to analyst 
reports. Whereas the stand-alone coefficients for these variables in column 3 are to be 
interpreted as the effect of the respective variable on abnormal stock returns in non-crisis 
                                                     
14 The use of control variables at the company and broker/analyst level is becoming ever more common in the 
market reactions literature (see Barber et al., 2006; Barniv et al., 2010 and Hugon and Muslu, 2010, among others). 
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Table 4: Short-term market reactions to analyst reports and financial crisis impact
No Crisis Crisis Full sample
(1) (2) (3)
UPGRADE 0.006 *** 0.008 *** 0.005 ***
(6.10) (2.62) (5.88)
DOWNGRADE -0.016 *** -0.025 *** -0.016 ***
(-15.91) (-9.71) (-16.00)
TP_REV 0.145 *** 0.149 *** 0.147 ***
(66.48) (27.83) (68.12)
EPS_REV 0.030 *** 0.043 *** 0.031 ***
(34.03) (16.21) (34.46)
CRISIS 0.008 ***
(16.50)
UPGRADE x CRISIS 0.001
(0.49)
DOWNGRADE x CRISIS -0.010 ***
(-4.41)
TP_REV x CRISIS 0.011 **
(2.38)
EPS_REV x CRISIS 0.012 ***
(5.25)
LOG_MKTCAP -0.003 *** -0.005 * -0.005 ***
(-3.97) (-1.84) (-7.29)
PTBV 0.000 -0.001 -0.000
(0.25) (-1.10) (-1.18)
BROKER_SIZE 0.000 -0.000 * 0.000
(0.51) (-1.79) (0.80)
ANALYST_COMP 0.000 0.000 * 0.000 **
(0.99) (1.90) (2.08)
ANALYST_COUNTR -0.000 0.004 -0.000
(-0.44) (1.13) (-0.06)
Constant 0.019 *** 0.045 ** 0.035 ***
(3.25) (2.12) (6.47)
Analyst-company fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
N 292,075 65,880 357,955
Adj. R2 11.1% 11.9% 10.1%
F 777.53 161.77 655.81
This table shows regression results of five-day cumulative abnormal returns around the analyst report date on various analyst
measures and the impact of the 2008 financial crisis, defined as the period from October 10, 2007 to March 09, 2009. Results for the
sub-sample of reports published outside the crisis are shown in column (1), whereas results for the sub-sample of reports published
during the crisis are shown in column (2). The full sample results are shown in column (3). UPGRADE is a dummy variable
indicating whether a stock recommendation is an upgrade relative to the same analyst's previous rating on the same stock, whereas
DOWNGRADE is a dummy variable indicating whether a stock recommendation is a downgrade. TP_REV and EPS_REV measure
the percentage change in an analyst's target price or earnings forecast revision. CRISIS is a dummy variable indicating whether an
analyst report was published during the crisis. LOG_MKTCAP is the natural logarithm of the market capitalization (in millions of
U.S. dollars), and PTBV is the price-to-book value, of the subject company on the analyst report research date. BROKER_SIZE is the
number of companies followed by a broker in a calendar year. ANALYST_COMP and ANALYST_COUNTR are the number of
companies followed by an analyst, and the countries represented by them, in a calendar year. All models are estimated allowing for
analyst-company fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by analyst-company and reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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times, the interaction coefficients render the incremental crisis effect of the respective analyst 
report metric on abnormal returns. 
Concerning stock recommendation upgrades, the table reports statistically significant 
but economically small coefficients of 0.006 for the non-crisis subsample (column (1)) and 
0.008 for the crisis subsample (column (2)). The extended model in column (3) does not 
provide any evidence that there is a significantly larger stock price reaction associated with 
ܷܲܩܴܣܦܧ  during the crisis, as the interaction coefficient for ܷܲܩܴܣܦܧ ൈ ܥܴܫܵܫܵ  is 
insignificant. 
With respect to stock recommendation downgrades, the short-term abnormal stock 
returns are generally stronger, with coefficients ranging from -0.016 in non-crisis times 
(column (1)) to -0.025 during the crisis (column (2)), which corresponds to an increment of 
almost 60%. The full sample results in column (3) confirm a statistically significant 
incremental crisis impact of roughly -0.010, as can be observed from the coefficient on the 
interaction variable ܦܱܹܰܩܴܣܦܧ ൈ ܥܴܫܵܫܵ. These results suggest that the average short-
term market reaction to stock recommendation downgrades was significantly more 
pronounced during the crisis than it was in non-crisis times. This is consistent with Hess et 
al. (2012), who report significantly larger excess returns during the first three trading days 
after stock recommendation downgrades (and also upgrades) issued during an economic 
recession compared to those issued during an expansion. 
Concerning target price revisions, the marginal effect of ܶܲ_ܴܧܸ  on ܥܣܴሺെ2;൅2ሻ 
ranged from 0.145 in non-crisis to 0.149 during crisis times. In column (3), the base 
coefficient is 0.147 with a crisis interaction coefficient of 0.011, significant at the 5% level. 
Although these figures, again, suggest that stock price reactions to analyst research were 
more pronounced during the crisis, we do not put too much emphasis on these results for 
now as the crisis impact seems to be comparatively low in economic terms, at least as far as 
this short-term event window (-2;+2) is concerned. We refer to the next section for an 
investigation of longer event windows. 
Finally, the coefficient of ܧܲܵ_ܴܧܸ is 0.030 for the non-crisis sub-sample (column (1)) 
but 0.043 during the crisis (column (2)). That is, the coefficient estimate during the crisis is 
approximately 40% larger than the non-crisis coefficient. The full sample analysis of column 
(3) confirms this result with a base coefficient of 0.031 and an interaction coefficient of 0.012, 
both significant at the 1% level. 
The multivariate results presented thus far provide further evidence that stock price 
reactions during the crisis could have been stronger than stock price reactions outside the 
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crisis. From the interactions of the four analyst report metrics with the dummy variable 
ܥܴܫܵܫܵ it follows that the incremental effect the financial crisis had on the corresponding 
coefficients was either significantly positive, as was the case for stock recommendation 
downgrades, earnings forecast revisions and (although with economically limited relevance) 
target price revisions, or it was statistically insignificant, as was the case for 
recommendation upgrades. In contrast, there is no evidence at all that the crisis could have 
led to even weaker investor reactions. We conclude that there is some evidence that 
investors relied considerably more on analysts’ opinions during the crisis. This is consistent 
with reliable information from other sources being scarce during that time. However, we 
recall our results from Section 3, where we demonstrated that during the crisis analysts – not 
surprisingly – provided comparably inaccurate research in terms of forecast accuracy, at 
least from an ex-post perspective. That given, our results from Table 4 suggest that investors 
relied most on analyst research when they should have done so least. 
 
4.3. Multivariate analysis of mid-term abnormal returns 
The results from the previous section show a clear tendency yet are not entirely 
consistent as the results for recommendation upgrades and target price revisions were 
weaker than those for downgrades and earnings forecast revisions. It could be that the larger 
coefficients on ܦܱܹܰܩܴܣܦܧ  and ܧܲܵ_ܴܧܸ  during the crisis and the corresponding 
significantly positive interaction coefficients in Table 4 can be attributed to short-term 
overreaction. If this were the case, we should expect the cumulative abnormal returns to 
revert to their non-crisis levels subsequent to the publication date of the analyst report. 
It could also be that the effects are persistent, and that ܷܲܩܴܣܦܧ and ܶܲ_ܴܧܸ show a 
similar and economically relevant pattern which is simply not captured by the estimation 
window for which we calculate cumulative abnormal returns, which is somewhat 
arbitrary.15 
We address these considerations by decomposing the short-term cumulative 
abnormal returns ܥܣܴሺെ2;൅2ሻ  into a mid-term effect starting at day -2 relative to the 
publication date of the analyst report and lasting until 20 trading days after the publication 
(ܥܣܴሺെ2;൅20ሻ) and a post-announcement effect capturing the stock market returns from 
day +3 until day +20, that is, the cumulative abnormal returns subsequent to the publication  
                                                     
15 Initial evidence on stock recommendations comes from Hess et al. (2012) who report short-term excess-returns 
for buy and sell recommendations, as well as for upgrades and downgrades, if these were issued during 
economic recession. However, only recession sells and downgrades continue to outperform their expansion 
period peer groups in the long run, whereas buys and upgrades underperform over a six-months investment 
horizon, which implies that short-term excess returns are attributable to a market overreaction. 
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Table 5: Mid-term market reactions to analyst reports and financial crisis impact
CAR(-2;+20) CAR(+3;+20)
No Crisis Crisis Full sample No Crisis Crisis Full sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
UPGRADE 0.006 *** 0.006 0.006 *** 0.000 -0.002 0.000
(4.19) (1.34) (3.96) (0.26) (-0.49) (0.14)
DOWNGRADE -0.018 *** -0.026 *** -0.018 *** -0.002 * -0.002 -0.002 **
(-12.50) (-7.05) (-12.82) (-1.78) (-0.56) (-2.12)
TP_REV 0.108 *** 0.159 *** 0.111 *** -0.037 *** 0.010 -0.036 ***
(34.58) (21.11) (36.19) (-16.37) (1.62) (-16.00)
EPS_REV 0.027 *** 0.044 *** 0.027 *** -0.004 *** 0.001 -0.004 ***
(20.04) (11.96) (20.45) (-3.85) (0.30) (-3.58)
CRISIS 0.008 *** 0.000
(9.53) (0.23)
UPGRADE x CRISIS -0.002 -0.003
(-0.46) (-1.01)
DOWNGRADE x CRISIS -0.007 ** 0.003
(-2.12) (1.12)
TP_REV x CRISIS 0.060 *** 0.049 ***
(9.01) (8.95)
EPS_REV x CRISIS 0.018 *** 0.006 **
(5.54) (2.28)
LOG_MKTCAP -0.049 *** -0.066 *** -0.052 *** -0.047 *** -0.061 *** -0.047 ***
(-32.49) (-15.16) (-41.15) (-35.62) (-16.59) (-44.13)
PTBV -0.006 *** -0.003 *** -0.006 *** -0.006 *** -0.003 *** -0.005 ***
(-16.79) (-2.90) (-17.65) (-19.68) (-3.10) (-21.12)
BROKER_SIZE 0.000 *** 0.000 ** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
(6.86) (2.58) (6.89) (8.19) (4.36) (7.86)
ANALYST_COMP 0.000 0.001 * 0.000 ** -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.45) (1.79) (1.96) (-0.11) (0.82) (1.06)
ANALYST_COUNTR -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.004 -0.001
(-0.35) (-0.16) (-0.55) (-0.18) (-0.98) (-0.66)
Constant 0.410 *** 0.534 *** 0.429 *** 0.391 *** 0.488 *** 0.394 ***
(32.95) (15.15) (41.78) (36.73) (16.40) (45.42)
Analyst-company fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 292,075 65,880 357,955 292,075 65,880 357,955
Adj. R2 9.4% 11.0% 8.0% 7.8% 8.6% 6.8%
F 417.59 105.02 404.84 363.76 71.61 331.53
This table shows regression results of cumulative abnormal returns over two different time windows around the analyst report date on
various analyst measures and the impact of the 2008 financial crisis, defined as the period from October 10, 2007 to March 09, 2009. In
columns (1) through (3) the dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal returns from day -2 to day +20 relative to the publication of
the analyst report. In columns (4) through (6) the dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal returns from day +3 to day +20 relative
to the publication of the analyst report. Results for the sub-sample of reports published outside the crisis are shown in columns (1) and
(4), whereas results for the sub-sample of reports published during the crisis are shown in column (2) and (5), respectively. The full
sample results are shown in column (3) and (6). UPGRADE is a dummy variable indicating whether a stock recommendation is an
upgrade relative to the same analyst's previous rating on the same stock, whereas DOWNGRADE is a dummy variable indicating
whether a stock recommendation is a downgrade. TP_REV and EPS_REV measure the percentage change in an analyst's target price or
earnings forecast revision. CRISIS is a dummy variable indicating whether an analyst report was published during the crisis.
LOG_MKTCAP is the natural logarithm of the market capitalization (in millions of U.S. dollars), and PTBV is the price-to-book value, of
the subject company on the analyst report research date. BROKER_SIZE is the number of companies followed by a broker in a calendar
year. ANALYST_COMP and ANALYST_COUNTR are the number of companies followed by an analyst, and the countries represented by
them, in a calendar year. All models are estimated allowing for analyst-company fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by analyst-
company and reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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( ܥܣܴሺ൅3;൅20ሻ ). Table 5 displays the results for the regression analyses with these 
alternative cumulative abnormal returns as the dependent variable. The results for 
ܥܣܴሺെ2;൅20ሻ are shown in the left part of Table 5, whereas the results for ܥܣܴሺ൅3;൅20ሻ 
can be found in the right part. We report subsample results for the non-crisis and crisis 
periods in columns (1) and (4) and in columns (2) and (5), respectively, whereas the full 
sample results including the interactions of ܷܲܩܴܣܦܧ, ܦܱܹܰܩܴܣܦܧ, ܶܲ_ܴܧܸ and ܧܲܵ_ܴܧܸ 
with ܥܴܫܵܫܵ are in column 3 (6). 
Concerning stock recommendation upgrades, Table 5 reveals that the mid-term 
market reactions CAR(-2;+20) were fairly small (0.006) and not any different during versus 
outside the crisis. The interaction coefficient on ܷܲܩܴܣܦܧ ൈ ܥܴܫܵܫܵ is virtually zero and 
statistically insignificant, so there is no evidence of significantly different (mid-term) market 
reactions to stock recommendation upgrades in crisis versus non-crisis times. Moreover, the 
coefficients on ܷܲܩܴܣܦܧ  for ܥܣܴሺെ2;൅20ሻ  are comparable in size to the short-term 
reactions reported in Table 4. Accordingly, the coefficients on ܷܲܩܴܣܦܧ  for the post-
announcement period (+3;+20) in columns (4) through (6) as well as the coefficient for 
ܷܲܩܴܣܦܧ ൈ ܥܴܫܵܫܵ  are all statistically undistinguishable from zero. These results are 
complemented by Figure 2, which provides an illustration of how stock prices assimilate the 
information conveyed through recommendation upgrades. Based on the coefficients of 
ܷܲܩܴܣܦܧ in Table 4 as well as additional untabulated regressions the chart illustrates how 
the coefficient of ܷܲܩܴܣܦܧ evolves as the event window increases by steps of one day.16 We 
point out that the magnitude of regression coefficients on ܷܲܩܴܣܦܧ displayed in the figure 
as well as in Table 5 suggests that recommendation upgrades generally had a very limited 
incremental impact on stock returns in absolute terms, regardless of the economic cycle.17 
This is consistent with earlier studies which find only little informational value in stock 
recommendation upgrades once analysts’ target price and earnings forecast revisions are 
controlled for (e.g., Asquith et al., 2005). 
In response to stock recommendation downgrades, Table 5 reports mid-term 
abnormal returns of -0.018 over the entire 23-day period (-2;+20) for analyst reports issued 
during non-crisis times (column (1)). For reports issued during the crisis the coefficient  
is -0.026 (column (2)), which corresponds to a difference of roughly 40%. The interaction 
coefficient on ܦܱܹܰܩܴܣܦܧ ൈ ܥܴܫܵܫܵ in the full-sample model in column (3) confirms that  
                                                     
16 Each value in Figure 2 represents the slope coefficient on ܷܲܩܴܣܦܧ from a regression where the dependent 
variable is ܥܣܴሺെ2;െ2ሻ, then ܥܣܴሺെ2;െ1ሻ, and so forth, to finally reach ܥܣܴሺെ2;൅20ሻ. 
17 For the non-crisis sub-sample, the maximum marginal effect is 0.007 reached on day +14; for the crisis sub-
sample, it is 0.008, reached on day +2. 
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the incremental market reaction during the crisis is statistically significant at the 5%-level. 
Recalling that the short-term market reactions ܥܣܴሺെ2;൅2ሻ to ܦܱܹܰܩܴܣܦܧ  displayed a 
similar difference between non-crisis and crisis times, these results suggest that the initial 
market reaction was not generally due to investor overreaction. In fact, the post-publication 
effects associated with ܦܱܹܰܩܴܣܦܧ, as displayed in columns (4) through (6) of Table 5, 
confirm that there is no material reversion effect in the case of stock recommendation 
downgrades. The coefficients are economically small (-0.002 for both sub-samples 
considered) and statistical significances are generally weak. In addition, there is no 
noticeable difference between these post-publication abnormal returns in crisis versus non-
crisis times, as the interaction coefficient for ܦܱܹܰܩܴܣܦܧ ൈ ܥܴܫܵܫܵ in column (6) is not 
statistically significant at ordinary levels. We interpret these results as evidence that the 
particularly strong market reactions to stock recommendation downgrades that were 
published during the crisis persisted for at least 20 trading days after the publication and 
were not due to investor overreaction. This picture is further corroborated by the illustration 
in Figure 3. The figure confirms that the short-term cumulative abnormal returns to 
downgrades were particularly strong during the crisis, and that this excess market reaction 
did not revert within the 20 trading days after the recommendation. Our results on the post-
publication returns in response to recommendation downgrades are in line with those 
Figure 2: Cumulative abnormal return to analysts’ stock recommendation upgrades, by event day
This figure illustrates how the marginal impact of analysts' stock recommendation upgrades on the cumulative abnormal return
evolved as the length of the event window increases.
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presented by Hess et al. (2012), who find that downgraded stocks underperform the peer 
group for as long as six months after the recommendation change. 
We now turn our attention to analysts’ revisions of target prices. We recall that Table 
4 revealed economically and statistically significant short-term abnormal returns associated 
with this metric, but only very small differences in crisis versus non-crisis times. In contrast 
to this, columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 provide evidence that the mid-term market reactions 
to ܶܲ_ܴܧܸ during the crisis (0.159) were significantly stronger that outside the crisis (0.108). 
Again, this corresponds to an increase of approximately +50% in the corresponding 
coefficient. The positive interaction coefficient on ܶܲ_ܴܧܸ ൈ ܥܴܫܵܫܵ of 0.060 in column (3) 
confirms this observation. Shifting the attention to the right part of Table 5, the coefficient of 
-0.037 in column (4) suggests that the post-publication abnormal returns ܥܣܴሺ൅3;൅20ሻ to 
ܶܲ_ܴܧܸ in non-crisis times were negative on average. That is, there was some reversion 
effect subsequent to the initial market reaction. For the crisis subsample, in contrast, the 
coefficient is statistically insignificant (0.010) and does not confirm such a reversal effect. The 
full sample results in column (6), and the coefficient on ܶܲ_ܴܧܸ ൈ ܥܴܫܵܫܵ  in particular, 
confirm that the reversion of cumulated abnormal returns over the (+3;+20) period 
associated with ܶܲ_ܴܧܸ can only be observed for the non-crisis but not for the crisis sub-
sample. Overall, with respect to analysts’ target price revisions we conclude that although  
the short-term market reactions were not significantly different in the two economic settings 
Figure 3: Cumulative abnormal return to analysts’ stock recommendation downgrades, by event day
This figure illustrates how the marginal impact of analysts' stock recommendation downgrades on the cumulative abnormal return
evolved as the length of the event window increases.
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that we consider, the mid-term reactions suggest that, again, the stock market reactions were 
more pronounced and more persistent if the report was published during the crisis. The 
corresponding illustration in Figure 4 even suggests that during the crisis stock prices only 
gradually assimilated the information conveyed through target price revisions and that this 
price formation process lasted until approximately 9 trading days after the target price 
revision.18 
Finally, we turn towards analysts’ earnings forecast revisions. While the short-term 
results in Table 4 already revealed that abnormal returns associated with ܧܲܵ_ܴܧܸ were 
particularly strong during the crisis, the corresponding coefficients in columns (1) through (3) 
of Table 5 confirm that these differential market reactions persisted during the (-2;+20) 
window. The marginal impact of ܧܲܵ_ܴܧܸ on ܥܣܴሺെ2;൅20ሻ was only 0.027 in non-crisis 
times (column (1)) but 0.044 – and therefore almost 70% higher – during the crisis (column 
(2)). Both coefficients are statistically significant at the 1%-level. The interaction coefficient 
on ܧܲܵ_ܴܧܸ ൈ ܥܴܫܵܫܵ  in column (3) further confirms the statistical significance of the 
incremental crisis impact. Concerning the post-publication abnormal returns, the base 
coefficients of ܧܲܵ_ܴܧܸ in columns (4) and (6) imply that in non-crisis times there was some  
reversion of the initial market reactions, although we admit that the economic relevance of 
                                                     
18 This is confirmed by untabulated regressions, which yield the largest coefficient for ܶܲ_ܴܧܸ in the crisis sub-
sample if the dependent variable is ܥܣܴሺെ2;൅9ሻ. 
Figure 4: Cumulative abnormal return to analysts’ target price revisions, by event day
This figure illustrates how the marginal impact of analysts' target price revisions on the cumulative abnormal return evolved as the
length of the event window increases.
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this effect is limited (-0.004). In contrast, during the crisis no such post-publication reversion 
can be observed as the insignificant coefficient on ܧܲܵ_ܴܧܸ  in column (5) and the 
significantly positive interaction coefficient of 0.006 in column (6) suggest. Figure 5 
graphically supports the notion that during the crisis stock price reactions to earnings 
forecast revisions were larger and more persistent than outside the crisis. The figure even 
reveals that during the crisis the market took until about day +8 to fully reflect the news 
from analysts’ earnings forecast revisions in stock prices. 19  These results are entirely 
consistent with those for ܶܲ_ܴܧܸ. 
Overall, our findings from Section 4 suggest that the financial crisis had an 
enhancing impact on the market reactions associated with the publication of sell-side 
analysts’ reports. While the stock market reactions to recommendation upgrades were 
generally limited regardless of the market phase, recommendation downgrades triggered 
significantly stronger short-term market reactions during the crisis, which persisted until at 
least 20 days after the publication of the analyst report. With respect to target price and 
earnings forecast revisions, the short-term market reactions were significantly stronger and 
persistent when these were issued during the 2008 financial crisis, whereas they were partly 
temporary and reverting when the corresponding report was issued during non-crisis times. 
We interpret the significantly stronger market reactions to analysts’ target price and 
                                                     
19 Again, untabulated results confirm this observation. 
Figure 5: Cumulative abnormal return to analysts’ earnings forecast revisions, by event day
This figure illustrates how the marginal impact of analysts' earnings forecast revisions on the cumulative abnormal return evolved
as the length of the event window increases.
0
.01
.02
.03
.04
.05
M
ar
gi
na
l c
um
ul
at
iv
e 
ab
no
rm
al
 re
tu
rn
-2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Event day relative to report date
No Crisis Crisis
24 
 
earnings forecast revisions as evidence that investors had particularly low confidence in 
their own expectations of future stock returns and firms’ earnings prospects and, therefore, 
put much emphasis on analysts’ opinions during the financial crisis. A likely reason is that 
due to the volatile market environment during the downturn it was even more challenging 
for market participants than in other periods to make precise forecasts concerning how their 
investments would fare in the future. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we investigate how the 2008 financial crisis impacted sell-side analysts’ 
behavior and performance as well as investor reactions to analyst reports. We argue that this 
is an interesting field of study because the crisis most likely had a detrimental impact on 
analysts’ performance although it is exactly these economically volatile and unpredictable 
times when investors’ need for valuable external advice is biggest.  
With respect to analysts’ behavior and performance, the results reveal that during 
the crisis analysts adjusted their expectations downward in absolute terms, as the 
distribution of stock recommendations as well as average target price and earnings forecast 
revisions suggest. At the same time, however, their relative (implied) optimism even 
increased. In particular, analysts’ stock return prospects and earnings yields implicitly 
assumed in their target prices and earnings forecasts were significantly more optimistic 
during than outside the crisis. This had a detrimental impact on the quality of their research. 
For instance, analysts’ average earnings forecast error during the crisis was as high as 30.7%, 
up from 21.0% during non-crisis times. Consequently, analysts’ absolute downward 
adjustments of their expectations were relatively too low, compared to the contemporaneous 
stock price performance during the downturn. That is, analysts underestimated the full 
impact of the 2008 financial crisis, which rendered their research output during that market 
phase less reliable to investors. 
Concerning market reactions, we report significantly higher cumulative abnormal 
returns to analyst reports during than outside the 2008 financial crisis. Additional findings 
suggest that these more pronounced market reactions during the crisis were not only due to 
temporary overreaction. Rather, they persisted until at least 20 trading days after the 
publication date of the analyst report, whereas outside the crisis analysts’ target prices and 
earnings forecast revisions were negatively associated with post-publication abnormal stock 
returns, suggesting that the initial market reactions were partly eliminated in the days 
following the release of a report. Overall, our results imply that investors relied relatively 
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more on analyst reports that were published during the crisis, potentially due to general lack 
of reliable information in the market during those days. We conclude that analyst research 
was most important to investors during the crisis, although the quality of such research in 
terms of forecasting accuracy was particularly low during that time. 
Our study suggests several directions for future research. One question that arises is 
whether performance differences between individual analysts persist over time, that is, 
whether analysts who were amongst the “best” researchers before the crisis were able to 
outperform their peers during the crisis as well. Consequently, it would be interesting to 
understand whether in times of crisis investors are able to identify “good” analysts in order 
to base their investment decisions on the best information available. 
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